addendum: there's also the fact that Intel deployed many illegal tactics to block Transmeta from selling to customers. This is another large part of why Transmeta failed. It seems entirely plausible that Intel pressured IBM to drop Transmeta as a customer.
https://archive.computerhistory.org/resources/access/text/20...
But I sort of remembered it wrong. Here he talks about having to switch from IBM but in page 16 he talks about the new lab not being able to make chips for a whole year as being the problem.
"In the end, Transmeta didn't make it, and I'll just say here I think it was not because of the technologies. It actually turned out to be manufacturing problems. We switched fabs. The fab we switched to actually had a problem, and couldn't actually make our chips for a year. We had to prove where the issue was in the fab, and what was happening. They're not happy if I speak too much about those details. But, the technology itself worked fine."
It's complicated enough to resolve things when you're dealing with instructions + hardware execution units.
When that becomes x86 instructions + CMS + native instructions + hardware execution units... it seems a daunting task to hit stability and outlier response targets for the system as a whole.
Using a speculative superscalar OoO would migrate part of the complexity from software to hardware. The major concern cited is usually power, but I don't know how much the renamer + scheduler would add relative to everything else; the hardware already had all the rest: extensive speculation support, branch predictors, large register file, store buffers, etc.
It's a fascinating topic and this isn't the ideal forum. However my point is this: there are very few companies out that that tries something truly new, and when one does and fail in the market there too much "told you so" going around.
Absolutely agreed. And from what I hear, the spirit of Transmeta ended up in a lot of other places (either via cleanroom design of similar tech, personnel working on similar projects, or inspiration).
People are also starting to wake up to the just how underhanded and illegal technology companies will behave to squash their competitors, whereas I think the 00s still had rose tinted glasses about the best technical product winning.
I had forgotten just how short the pipe was (~ 7 stages!). Going OOO would have added at least one stage.
History is written by the winners and outsiders tend to draw technology conclusions based business outcome, which is unfortunate and lacking in nuance.
Crusoe at the time of the release was far more power efficient than anything Intel had to offer and was a revolution to the notebook market. Intel has officially credited Transmeta's LongRun as the motivation for creating SpeedStep.
Performance of Crusoe ("Fred") fell short of the expectations as the approach assumed a faster VLIW core. CMS was very good, but couldn't compensate for the hardware. Had Transmeta not made terrible business screw-ups, the architecture could perhaps have had the iterations necessary the improve the technology. The third generation ("Tokomak") would have been significantly better and almost happened, except for ... business reasons.
IMhO, the original approach has two flaws:
1. Software based interpretation of cold code leads to a dramatic performance difference that can be nearly impossible to catch up to for some applications. IOW, the difference between worst and best performance is much too big.
2. Out-of-order execution is a much simpler and better way to deal with cache misses. The tricks and efforts that went into the architecture to compensate for the in-order execution were mind-boggling and were part of the reason the core was slower than it should have been.
NVIDIA's Denver improved (fixed?) 1. by added hardware acceleration for Arm decoding.