http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=2331182
the problem that the companies the law applies to aren't necessarily rich; they're not being taxed on their revenues, but on their valuations, which reflect investors' hopes about their future revenues. So they're effectively being asked now for money they don't have yet.
But in any case it would not be "special treatment" to exempt them; this is one of those laws that is so weird (zero other cities have it that I know of) that the only reason it has stayed on the books is that it has not actually been enforced in the past.
Second, most events that would cause such a huge rise in valuation are accompanied by a huge influx of cash. There may be some tiny edge cases, but a gangbusters IPO ain't one. The bill is due once a year, and imagining a company being without the cash for it stretches my imagination to the breaking point.
Third, "being asked now for money they don't have yet" is the entire reason the company is selling equity in the first place. They can surely budget for an extra 0.015 of an already proportionally tiny amount.
Fourth, they aren't taxed on valuations but on, to coin a term, their employees' realized compensation. This may be based on valuation, but justifiably so, since compensation is compensation.
Hell, a company with bottomless greed and a deep commitment to nickle & diming could probably find a way write the tax bill into their options contracts.
Fifth, the weird part of the law is that it is structured as a payroll tax rather than as an income, capital gains, or wealth tax.
Otherwise it appears to be a very honest attempt to fairly tax different forms of compensation in a non-regressive way.
I faintly recall a discussion of when you should accept dilution (which a tax is) if it raises your chances of success. I tend to assume that startups locate in SF rather than the non-SF bay area for reasons that they feel give them more than a 1.5%*employee equity higher chance of success (shorter commutes for your people, etc.).
More generally, it's only going to be the very large companies that want to exercise their option of exit for this reason: moving sucks and nobody wants to do it. By the time it's millions of dollars in taxes (i.e. valuation > $1bn or so) you'd think about it, but I'd guess not before. So it's not the greatest idea from a tax equity perspective: a tax only the extremely wealthy find it worth their while to dodge is still regressive. Lame capitulations to keep the few companies with this high-class problem in the city are probably correct from a utility-maximizing perspective, if kind of morally distasteful.
Why should a company with lots of tax gains not have to pay the same taxes on them as the company next door? Certainly they were familiar with the tax code and its consequences when they set up shop in that city.
The whole article reads me as simply "big successful company wants to avoid paying taxes."