Depends on framing. If you divide the population by an arbitrary standard with a very high health bias (employed, in big co), and adjust payments accordingly, then those on the wrong side of your arbitrary standard get shafted.

The second group may be unprofitable with lower payments, but the insurer doesn't even want the second group, the profits are from decreased expenditures on the first group.

Absent an individual mandate with actual teeth (or outright government providing of healthcare), do you have a solution that seems workable on a voluntary arms-length basis for all actors involved?

I’m not arguing those other conditions shouldn’t exist, but rather making the weaker, more limited argument considering “given the arrangement of the insurance market as it exists today, what should the price for that insurance offer be?” In other words, “What should a for-profit insurance company do, acting on their own and immediately?” because I think that’s pretty close to the question they’re facing when setting pricing for individual plans.

Ah, yes, the good old supply and demand theory of health: if you can‘t pay for your healthcare, you obviously have no need for it, because needs are only things you are willing and able to pay for.

It’s more like “if the cost to serve a broad population P is $X, I don’t think it’s screwing them to say ‘the price cannot be lower than $X’ because we are a health insurance company, not a charity.”

I think you’re arguing that perhaps health outcomes should not be funded by private for-profit insurance companies and I’d agree, but while it is, this outcome seems grounded in actuarially sound math.

How is charging X more for Y's behavior not screwing X?

I’m genuinely not understanding the X and Y category or behavior you’re contemplating here.

Is Y’s behavior being on average healthier and therefore less costly to insure?