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Re:An SSL cert that is valid for any and all domains and all... by skyzyx on Friday May 15, 2020 @12:46AM (#23188982)
This is grossly irresponsible.
Re:An SSL cert that is valid for any and all domains and all... by nexuist on Friday May 15, 2020 @02:09AM (#23189404)
It's a joke, no? Nobody in their right mind would actually use this in production (of course, now that I've said that, they will, but I digress).
Re:An SSL cert that is valid for any and all domains and all... by el_dev_hell on Friday May 15, 2020 @02:20AM (#23189464)
It's 100% a joke and will 100% end up being used in production eventually.
Re:An SSL cert that is valid for any and all domains and all... by pilif on Friday May 15, 2020 @02:25AM (#23189488)
For this to be useful in production, it would need to be signed by a proper CA. No CA will sign this. And if they accidentally did, it would be revoked immediately in order to not end up like Diginotar and Symantec
Re:An SSL cert that is valid for any and all domains and all... by squiggleblaz on Friday May 15, 2020 @05:01AM (#23190234)
Diginotar and Symantec ended up like Diginotar and Symantec. Even Let's Encrypt backed down. There seems to be strong pressure on CAs to not do the secure thing when they've made a mistake.
Re:An SSL cert that is valid for any and all domains and all... by jeroenhd on Friday May 15, 2020 @11:10AM (#23193035)
Re:An SSL cert that is valid for any and all domains and all... by dtech on Friday May 15, 2020 @02:44AM (#23189596)
A valid use case would be local development or MITM'ing yourself
Re:An SSL cert that is valid for any and all domains and all... by mike_d on Friday May 15, 2020 @04:43AM (#23190142)
MITM proxies ran by organizations (governments) that also own certificate authorities is exactly why certificates like this are rejected by browsers on syntax alone.

You can't wildcard at the root or TLD, and you can't have two wildcard labels in a DNS name.

Re:An SSL cert that is valid for any and all domains and all... by jeroenhd on Friday May 15, 2020 @11:16AM (#23193112)
Browsers not only accept MitM certificates, they have special exceptions for them. If you import a CA certificate, Chrome and Firefox will ignore certain features (such as certificate transparency requirements) even for domains and IPs that resolve to the routable internet.

The go-to solution for this is to load a certificate authority into the proxy itself and have it generate certificates on the fly.

I think the wildcard rules are more to protect people in case of a certificate authority breach than to protect against MitM. Imagine if DigiNotar would sign a certificate in the form of ⁎.⁎.⁎ instead of just some Google domains and browser would actually accept that!

Re:An SSL cert that is valid for any and all domains and all... by mike_d on Friday May 15, 2020 @08:03PM (#23198998)
Yes, the _correct_ way to do it is with a CA certificate. But since CA certificates do not have a CommonName or SAN, you have to have clients that support SNI so you know what host the client is requesting so you can quickly generate and sign a one-off certificate.

The browser restrictions were in place before SNI was really widespread, and you needed funky certificates like the one in the original link because you had no way to predict if someone was trying to access google.com or facebook.com and you risked generating a browser warning if you offered up the wrong one.