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Re:Persistent Login Cookie Best Practice by warp on Friday March 11, 2011 @11:08AM (#2313773)
In many scenarios in which an attacker has access to your cookies he/she would also be able to perform a man-in-the-middle attack.

Encryption without confirming the identity of the other side is only slightly better than no encryption at all.

I agree that in theory it's a bad that thing many people think encryption with authentication is worse than no encryption at all, but in practice it doesn't matter. You cannot trust either of those options anyway.

Re:Persistent Login Cookie Best Practice by Udo on Friday March 11, 2011 @11:17AM (#2313807)
I disagree. The simplest thing an attacker can do is sniffing the local traffic. It's a passive job, they don't even have to crack or break into anything, and what they're doing is essentially undetectable. Encryption helps against this, but not against man-in-the-middle attacks, that's true. However, those attacks are much more difficult to pull off than sniffing. Especially if you exchange a cert with your server just once, as you do in SSH. I do believe denying users access to encryption out of a fear of man-in-the-middle attacks and instead defaulting them to a completely unsecured link was and remains a dick move.

In case it wasn't obvious: I love SSH because it doesn't rely on cert authorities and because it's ridiculously easy to establish a reasonably secure connection; it empowers users and server admins to no end. Is it exploitable? Yes! But I do believe it's difficult and far less likely than exploiting an unencrypted connection. And I'll say it again: denying users access to this basic mechanism was not a nice maneuver.

Re:Persistent Login Cookie Best Practice by tptacek on Friday March 11, 2011 @03:05PM (#2314674)
Virtually nobody "sniffs local traffic" anymore, unless it's stub resolver traffic to bounce people to a MITM server. The MITM attack is the gold standard. It's not 1995 anymore and nobody is installing SunSniff on Sprintnet's backbone.