Not to excuse Lenovo - they fucked up big.
https://thehackernews.com/2015/09/lenovo-laptop-virus.html?m...
The firmware rootkit, to my knowledge, has never been found on ThinkPads.
Have you configured your browser(s) to "fail closed" when it comes to OCSP queries? CRL and OCSP behavior has been, well, "not ideal" since basically forever.
in the case of a starbucks, the AP itself is not necessarily secure (under a counter somewhere?) so it's possible users are connecting to a malicious AP.
the threat model depends on the level of risk: the convenience may outweigh those risks, it may not. for myself it is one of a few tasks i wouldn't engage in on a network i don't have more trust in, but in retrospect this advice was indeed probably too strong for most.
Again, what’s the threat model here? Exploiting a browser vulnerability? Maybe?
https://www.cnet.com/news/superfish-torments-lenovo-owners-w...
It did MITM to inject ads, including adding their cert to the trust store to MITM SSL connections.
Of course the software needed the private key to work, which they shipped to every laptop and was quickly put online.
All of the sudden banking at coffee shops on a lot of Lenovo models was no longer private.
I'm not sure if captured traffic could be retroactively decrypted, but I wouldn't doubt it. PFS support probably wasn't high on Superfish's priorities.