This is true, but I think a DP-3T like protocol (ex the Apple-Google spec) doesn't actually pose much risk here. The hypothetical drug dealer or other illicit contact can receive a notification that they were potentially exposed to someone that was infected, but in general no one else (a police officer, a spouse, etc) will be able to determine who was in contact with who.
In order to link someone to a particular location, you would need to observe their broadcast identifier while they were there and also link their diagnosis key back to them (this is likely to be quite difficult for most actors to accomplish).
In order to reveal a contact between two people, you would either need to do the above for both of them or to observe at least one of them at that location and time in some other manner.
Personally, I will not opt-in to this technology, and if forced to use it, I will leave my phone at home. It’s a small act of civil disobedience but it’s a necessary one IMO.
It’s alarming to me how so many in tech seem welcoming of, even excited for, this technology. I say this as someone who wrote my senior thesis on a subject related to privacy enhancing technology, so I’m familiar with the ideas.
It gets contact tracing right by accomplishing the goal while yielding almost no ground on privacy and remaining almost entirely offline. In an ideal world, all new technologies would be implemented in such a focused manner without regard for turning a profit.
I'm puzzled by your concern about normalization of self-surveillance; everyone I know has already voluntarily made drastic alterations to their behaviors due to current circumstances. I really don't see what introduction of this technology changes.
> who’s to say an emphasis will remain on privacy in future iterations of the technology?
If people don't object to widespread state surveillance later, would they have objected now? I don't see why a decentralized technology specifically built to prevent surveillance should lead to an increase in acceptance of it.
I would like to note that a v1.1 has recently been released, my information is about v1.0.
The ENSelfExposureInfoRequest class can be used by an app to obtain diagnosis keys for the previous 14 days. What an app does with those keys is up to whoever implements it.
https://covid19-static.cdn-apple.com/applications/covid19/cu...
This is an example off the top of my head, as other comments in this thread have explained, violence against people who have the virus is happening around the world and is something that must be accounted for in these protocols.
Edit: a link to a story from another comment (https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/coronaviru...). I hope you can see that this technology can worsen this.
As you'll have to provide information about your recent contacts to the authorities performing the contact tracing. At least that's how I understand our local law (Germany).
So I don't think its necessarily worse doing it with an App than doing it the old fashioned way. Sure digital traces are always easier to abuse, but then on the other hand, because things get automated, actually less people might get access to your data. Which would be a privacy win.
I believe what's even more important than how we design the app, is how we design the legal framework around it. We do need rock solid laws, having enforceable data retention periods, and that limit access to the pare minimum needed.
Unfortunately, our track record for the design of such laws has not been too good over the last years.