With F*, Dafny and the Lean theorem prover, it seems like Microsoft (at least the research division) is moving in the direction of formal verification but I hear very little about it's use on their commercial products. Trade secret, perhaps?
(Yeah, yeah, undecidability makes proving halting impossible. No. It's easy to prove that most code finishes. If you're writing a kernel driver and there is any ambiguity about whether the code will finish, you're doing something very wrong. If it's hard to prove termination, you add a loop counter so that after N tries, it gives up.)
The problem with all of these things (as with FramaC) is that they only work if you restrict the fragment of programs that you're looking at. Kernel modules work out surprisingly well, because they are not allowed to do a whole lot by convention.
This group got about as far as we did - arrays, but not dynamic allocation, pointers, or objects. "WP cannot currently work with dynamic allocation, " they write. That's the point at which describing what "valid" means becomes difficult, and you get into specification languages separate from the program.
I notice they put in what they called "ghost code", code which has meaning only at proof time. We called that "proof code". It's written in the same language as the real code, and can look at values from the output, but can't change them. This is a programmer-friendly way to write specifications. It's easy to write code to check a sort or a lookup if you're not concerned about speed or space. Then you prove that the dumb check and the complex algorithm get the same result.
One big problem with proof of correctness systems is that they tend to be designed by people in love with the formalism. They need to be designed by people who hate and fear bugs. The Microsoft Static Driver Verifier is probably the best example of a system aimed squarely at preventing crash-type bugs. It's the main tool Microsoft used to prevent drivers from crashing Windows 7 and later.