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Re:Formal Verification Creates Hacker-Proof Code (2016) by oldgradstudent on Sunday April 26, 2020 @05:14AM (#22985752)
If you do use formal methods, how do you know you completed the proof?
Re:Formal Verification Creates Hacker-Proof Code (2016) by lmm on Sunday April 26, 2020 @08:57AM (#22986819)
You have an automatic tool that tells you. Your program won't "compile" unless the proof is correct.

Whether you've proven the right thing still requires judgement - what you end up with is a provably correct implementation of what you thought you wanted. But that's a much smaller problem, and at a minimum you're guaranteed to have an unambiguous definition of what it is you actually built.

Re:Formal Verification Creates Hacker-Proof Code (2016) by oldgradstudent on Sunday April 26, 2020 @10:25AM (#22987367)
> Whether you've proven the right thing still requires judgement

That's my point.

Formal methods don't make bugs or debugging disappear. They move it to different domain - the development of the proof.

> what you end up with is a provably correct implementation of what you thought you wanted.

You end up with a provably correct implementation of what you thought you stated on what you thought you wanted.

Serious proofs are highly non-trivial. I've seen experts debate the exact semantics of the most simple properties.

Re:Formal Verification Creates Hacker-Proof Code (2016) by lmm on Sunday April 26, 2020 @11:02AM (#22987625)
> Formal methods don't make bugs or debugging disappear. They move it to different domain - the development of the proof.

They make the thing we usually call bugs and usually experience as debugging disappear. The thing that remains is a very different activity with very different properties.

Re:Formal Verification Creates Hacker-Proof Code (2016) by oldgradstudent on Sunday April 26, 2020 @11:13AM (#22987698)
> The thing that remains is a very different activity with very different properties.

Do you write a correct formal spec the first time round? I don't. Proofs sometimes pass or fail when they shouldn't.

When these problem occur I call them bugs, and I call process of finding and fixing them debugging.

Re:Formal Verification Creates Hacker-Proof Code (2016) by lmm on Sunday April 26, 2020 @11:59AM (#22988041)
> When these problem occur I call them bugs, and I call process of finding and fixing them debugging.

What do you find it has in common with the activities that we normally call debugging? For me debugging is characteristically about understanding how a system is behaving, essentially by bisecting: it's all about figuring out what should be the case at each point and identifying the point at which things start to go wrong. Whereas correcting a proof is very different: you immediately know where the problem is, and it's more about coming up with a new lemma or strategy - it's the same kind of activity as writing a new proof/program, whereas (traditional) debugging is very much a separate skill, IME.

Re:Formal Verification Creates Hacker-Proof Code (2016) by oldgradstudent on Monday April 27, 2020 @04:02PM (#22999397)
I view these as very similar.

A proof can fail for many reasons, and even in the simplest possible case, where the tool provides you with a counter example it could either be a real bug in the design/program/protocol, but there could also be something wrong with the specification you were given, or in your implementation of the specification, or in some assumptions you've made to simplify the proof, or there's ambiguity in the natural language description, or even some typo somewhere.

You now need to understand the domain and the system well enough to come up with an explanation of the phenomena. This is debugging.

Re:Formal Verification Creates Hacker-Proof Code (2016) by lmm on Monday April 27, 2020 @09:08PM (#23002205)
But you have access to everything at every stage. There's no need to figure out what the data is or how it got that way - the hard part of debugging - because there is no data, no state, no user input. It's more like fixing a compilation error than debugging.
Re:Formal Verification Creates Hacker-Proof Code (2016) by MaxBarraclough on Sunday April 26, 2020 @06:07AM (#22986002)
I don't follow. The proof is complete when all proof obligations have been discharged.
Re:Formal Verification Creates Hacker-Proof Code (2016) by oldgradstudent on Sunday April 26, 2020 @09:37AM (#22987041)
But how do you know you have the right proof obligations? It's very easy to discharge a massive number of proof obligations while proving nothing of interest.

Formal methods don't just make bugs and debugging disappear, they just move it to a different domain - the development of the proofs.

Re:Formal Verification Creates Hacker-Proof Code (2016) by MaxBarraclough on Sunday April 26, 2020 @04:45PM (#22990098)
I can't make sense of what you're saying. You've completed the proofs when you've discharged all proof obligations. The proof obligations will depend on the formal modelling system you use (Event-B, say), and of course on your formal model. You aren't left in a state of uncertainty as to whether you've finished discharging the proof obligations.

Are you referring to the possibility of errors in your model? That's not the same thing.

Re:Formal Verification Creates Hacker-Proof Code (2016) by oldgradstudent on Monday April 27, 2020 @04:07PM (#22999457)
> Are you referring to the possibility of errors in your model? That's not the same thing.

It is very easy to complete a proof on the wrong model, and there are always errors in the model, at least initially.

There's always an iterative process of refining the model until you are confident in its being good enough. When are you confident it is good enough? That's quite similar to asking "If you don't use formal methods, how do you know when your work is done?"

Re:Formal Verification Creates Hacker-Proof Code (2016) by MaxBarraclough on Tuesday April 28, 2020 @06:43AM (#23005640)
> It is very easy to complete a proof on the wrong model

That doesn't sound right. Automatic proof assistants/verifiers won't approve your proof unless it really is a proof for the model, right?

> there are always errors in the model, at least initially

Agreed.

> There's always an iterative process of refining the model until you are confident in its being good enough. When are you confident it is good enough?

It's true that bugs in the model are a possibility.

More broadly, it's possible for defects to get through a formal software-development methodology. There was an interesting case study done on this. [0] Vastly fewer than if formal methods are not used, but you're still right that ultimately it's not a completely rock-solid guarantee. (And that's not counting things like bugs in the proof-assistant, or bugs in the non-verified compiler you end up using.)

[0] https://www.adacore.com/tokeneer ('Analysis' section is on page 59 of PDF)

See also https://blog.adacore.com/tokeneer-fully-verified-with-spark-... , https://github.com/AdaCore/spark2014/tree/master/testsuite/g...