(a) Using FIPS cryptography, which is inferior, to placate the USG.
(b) Using best-practices cryptography, and being incompatible with some places that mandate FIPS.
(c) Supporting both FIPS and non-FIPS cryptography, which creates handshake bugs and gives you lowest-common-denominator security.
I think you can reasonable argue that (a) and (b) are both superior to (c); I think WireGuard made the right choice here.
In the long run, for enterprise environments, I don't think this much matters. Even with FIPS cryptography, stodgy enterprises won't adopt WireGuard until it becomes so prevalent elsewhere that they have to, simply because IPSEC has more standardization. So the WireGuard task is simply to make it so prevalent everywhere else that stodgy enterprises no long have a vote.
Like, I get that that is not likely to happen, but the resistance of the state to competence is not an excuse for resistance to it outside the state.
That said, the fatal flaw of Wireguard is the crypto model. Nobody who interacts with the US government, regulated US industries, or some F500 will be able to use it because of the fixed algorithm choice, which isn’t possibly FIPS 140-2 validatable. You’ll always need that Cisco/Pulse/whatever box.
That may be a feature for some, but it kneecaps the possibility of it being as ubiquitous as it might be otherwise.