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Re:Running an independent Arch Linux rebuilder by Bnshsysjab on Tuesday April 21, 2020 @06:39PM (#22940091)
I care more about if maintainers actually audit the contents of packages rather than if their builds are reproducible (though the latter still matters)!

Not just is there obvious malware, but also are there obvious vulnerabilities, is the person that wrote it of good nature / located in a country where they’re safe from nation state pressure, is there a lot of history behind the app.

Obviously this is too much work for any individual and requires a chain of trust. I believe fedora and Ubuntu at the very least audit to some extent but I’ve never seen any doco.

Re:Running an independent Arch Linux rebuilder by andr0x on Tuesday April 21, 2020 @06:49PM (#22940149)
Just curious, are you saying there is obvious malware within the Arch official repositories? Are you referring to instead the user repositories (AUR)?

I know Arch has: https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/Arch_Security_Team

but I'd be really interested to hear that the official packages have obvious malware.

Re:Running an independent Arch Linux rebuilder by saghm on Tuesday April 21, 2020 @07:39PM (#22940484)
I think they intended the phrase as a question; they're proposing that a maintainer should not just ask "is there obvious malware in this package?", but also several other questions (which they list afterwards).
Re:Running an independent Arch Linux rebuilder by Bnshsysjab on Wednesday April 22, 2020 @04:16AM (#22943341)
This is the correct interpret
Re:Running an independent Arch Linux rebuilder by karlding on Tuesday April 21, 2020 @08:48PM (#22940907)
Isn't this chain of trust essentially what crev [0] tries to do? FWIW Rust implements cargo-crev [1], but I suppose you could extend this to AUR packages with a bit of work.

[0] https://github.com/crev-dev/crev/

[1] https://github.com/crev-dev/cargo-crev