I agree DNSSEC isn't wonderful, but perfect is the enemy of good. I'd take 768 bit RSA over "doing nothing"-- it raises the difficulty level of a successful DNS attack enormously.
Some of us don't care about enumeration. If we do, there's whitelies, as you say, and eventually NSEC5 will be around.
> I don't know what point you're trying to make about BGP. I think you think I'm opposed to RPKI. I'm not.
You argued earlier that worrying so much about redirection isn't justified: "Say we protect DNS (we could, with a better protocol design). But other redirection protocols aren't protected. Do we similarly authenticate OSPF? IP options? ARP?"
In which case, maybe we should just ignore RPKI, too. :P And unfix source routing, not bother with SEND, etc.
Further evidence on this is easily obtained both from survey papers that collect DNSSEC misconfiguration statistics (they're hilarious) and from the IANIX collection; many of the organizations IANIX notes are extraordinarily clueful operators.
I'm right about this. It's feasible to get DNSSEC deployed globally (it would be a catastrophe, but we indeed have the tools to make that catastrophe happen). But it would be very, very expensive.
This has been a fun thread, but we are way into the right margin now and are probably the only two people reading it, so I suggest we tie it off at whatever your next response is.
That the root zone was signed with 1024-bit RSA in 2016 is its own dunk, and I think you for making it for me, but of course the root zone isn't the only zone; the 1024-bit root just meant every TLD was capped at that level of security. Now they're not, but the rest of the DNS is still littered with them. See: every DNSSEC survey.
And, of course, you've addressed only a small part of that previous argument --- just the key sizes.
I don't know what point you're trying to make about BGP. I think you think I'm opposed to RPKI. I'm not.