I once asked a pilot after a test mission, "if you're pretty sure they're going to do [tactic X] why don't you do [tactic that works great against tactic X]?" His response was that his mission isn't to win, it's to provide the most authentic simulation of an enemy as he can. If they don't think an enemy pilot would do something, they won't do it- even if they know they could gain an advantage using inside knowledge.
However, wouldn't the same pressures that apply to someone in a chain of command, also not apply to a contractor?
So, for example, if someone tasked with testing the current military strategy comes up with a wargame tactic that would embarrass the military (i.e. their bosses) they may not want to do that because embarrassing their bosses is probably not good for them.
However, in the same vein, someone reliant on those military bosses awarding them contracts would also not want to embarrass them, because it wouldn't be good for their ability to get contracts in the future.
In the former scenario, you at least have the case of a conscientious individual or team still going forward with what they think is the right thing to do.
In the latter there is no such compulsion either, so if anything, the chain of command argument makes things worse for contractors.
Makes for a great target for espionage on military tactics and capabilities for one risk.
For the military to directly hire a foreign national who served in a different military is a ton of paperwork. It's much easier to have the contractor do it.
There obviously is a security risk, but as long as you compartmentalize the risk it's okay. It's also the issue of keeping said Soviet MIG driver busy, in that maybe you have 6 months of work for him a year. Other six months of the year he can't exactly hang around the Pentagon and help with reports since as you mention, it's a security risk. The contractor can keep him working by say doing 6 months a year of training with the American military, 3 months of training with the Canadians, 2 months with the Swedish, etc.
There are proven models for minimizing risk. The intel agencies often like to hire foreign nations because they have local expertise with regard to their home country, but the CIA can't exactly just make a Chinese national a W-2 employee and let them run around Langley.
They probably have vulnerabilities but I don't think a training contractor is as juicy of a target as you might think. They only maintain information on the capabilities of the enemies they are supposed to simulate- aggressor units don't have information on the blue air capabilities. It not useless information, but it mostly doesn't make sense for Russia/China to spend their effort finding out what the US thinks Russia/China is capable of. They already have a pretty good idea.
What? Quite the opposite, it is totally valuable information, if you know, what your enemy thinks you can do. Because then you can adjust, to surprise him in real combat. Or you find out that they over- or underestimate you in a certain area, which is very valuable tactical information as well. So they surely are a target for foreign intelligence agencies, but I am pretty sure they know that.
> 'Of course we are,’ said Vetinari. ‘And the more we know about each other, the friendlier we shall remain. We’d hardly bother to spy on our enemies. What would be the point?’ - Lord Vetinari - Thud (Sir Terry Pratchett)
>They probably have vulnerabilities but I don't think a training contractor is as juicy of a target as you might think ... It not useless information, but it mostly doesn't make sense for Russia/China to spend their effort finding out what the US thinks Russia/China is capable of. They already have a pretty good idea.
This is contradictory. Classified information is, by definition, that which could cause harm to the national interest if disclosed. Either their information is valuable or it isn't.
Do foreign militaries also have these policies?
If you have a lot of 'comfortable' pilots, you have less need to do the training, so when you fight a war and start losing pilots, you have less bandwidth to create new ones.
So there's a couple of things:
You could always recall and retrain the ones you've released if you're low on pilots, that's pretty straightforward for a wartime government if they're desperate.
It is much harder to scale the recruiting / training pipeline if it is insufficient to comfortably replace the losses you're taking. So you run your pipeline at a higher rate than necessary so that in wartime you can maintain your forces.
I think this also explains why the US would allow Boeing to sell things like advanced air-force fighters to other countries. At the surface, it makes no sense to give away your best stuff to another country. But if you think about it, it lets you run your pipeline at a higher rate, and the other guy can't replace his stuff when it starts getting blown up, you get priority. So you get to run at closer to a wartime production rate, with maintenance subsidized by other countries.
It may be cheaper to do the pilot training another way, but the last thing you want is to end up with a shortage of pilots when you actually end up needing them. It is not about cost so much as it is about winning wars and the supply chain therin.
I suspect a lot of countries don't have this policy because they have a grand total of 22 planes and no way to replace them, so if they get blown up there's nothing for new pilots to fly.
tldr; think about them resources that get expended and that you will inevitably have to create more of, rather than as highly skilled professionals
For example there is no way I'm gonna believe a Saudi F15 doesn't have something that the US could manipulate to its advantage if it chose to.
Of course building a backdoor would mean if an event found it, then could also utilise it. And it would be bad for business if it was found.
That said, of late in the USAF, the promotion rate for every rank below Lt Col has been 95%+. And I think Lt Col has been fairly high as well. The issue isn't kicking them out once they reach a rank, but rather them deciding to get out before then.
It turns out that being Erich Hartmann, Maverick, or the Red Baron doesn't really translate well into being a good executive leader, and while western militaries want officers who have experience "at the sharp end", the also require leaders who understand how a headquarters works, logistics, politics, etc.
A contractor can maintain their jets however they want as long as it's safe and they can meet their contract requirements. The contract maintainers can stay at their job as long as they want. The USN and USAF maintainers move every few years and have pretty good retirement benefits (which used to be better but are still better than what most private companies give), and have to get lots of additional training and all that needs to be paid for. A contractor is still supposed to follow all the safety regulations, but contractors seem to be able to generate sorties at rates that military units couldn't manage even with double the manpower.
Contractor pilots are paid strictly to fly. Naval aviators and USAF pilots are both subject to "up or out" policies, where officers that aren't promoted are told to leave. This means military pilots have to serve as staff officers to keep themselves promotable. During a staff tour they either quit flying or they fly less, which kind of wastes the money spent on training them. There are good reasons for requiring this (and some good arguments against it), but the bottom line is that contractors don't have to worry about it and can operate cheaper because they aren't wasting 20% of their personnel budget with a fighter pilot working behind a desk.