Meanwhile in EMEA we've been using IRR (and recently RPKI) for automating filters for years now. I couldn't do a BGP hijack through my EU upstreams even if I wanted to.
As a bonus, my US upstream doesn't care if I have RPKI/ROA/IRR - even if I do, they ask for dead tree LOA anyway.
When I sent a dead tree to one of my EU upstreams out of habit they were like "what do I need this for?"
Take credit cards. As an end user you perceive some fairly heavyweight albeit imperfect security, but in reality there are two parallel systems and only one of them is using those security features.
Authorisation is the part that ties your good name to your transactions. The bank doesn't trust you, so considerable technological effort is used in Authorisation. Chip cards, PINs, extra passwords and codes for web transactions, that's all Authorization.
Settlement moves money between your account and a merchant account. This isn't secured at all, it's just based on trust. Any merchant can assert that you used your card to pay them any amount and by default the bank takes it on trust.
Authorisation is abuse resistant. If you try to replay the same authorization multiple times it doesn't work.
Settlement doesn't care. If a worker messes up and puts a big merchant's daily settlement transactions through twice, every single one of those transactions just happens again. Paid $80 for groceries leaving $38 in the account until pay day? Sorry, now you're $42 overdrawn. This really happens.
If you complain they'll fix it. If hundreds of customers complain they'll realize the error and fix it for everyone. But this is why you have to check your credit card bill. Sooner or later there will be errors, and if you don't check you'll never see them which can get expensive fast.
ISPs have noting of the kind. One routing mistake (or "mistake") and all of your customers' data suddenly went through China, Russia, US (you name it), for better or worse. What's worse, in a manner of speaking that data is now devalued. There's value date equivalent in the ISP's world. As a customer you have no avenues, the thing isn't even between you and any ISP you may work with. The bank will never get away with telling you "well we accidentally made this extra payment, it got routed thorough this extra bank, so now you lost 25% of the money".
As for Level 3 the world wonders.
But...
AS12389 announced them to Rascom (AS20764), who accepted them and sent them on to Cogent (AS174), who accepted them and propogated them on to Level3 (AS3356), who, unfortunately, then accepted them from Cogent.
The AS path would've been much longer than if Level3 had accepted them directly from AS12389 so, at the least, the actual effects of the hijacking weren't as bad as they could have been.
RIP can't cope with the scale of the internet today, but to say BGP is essential to interconnecting networks is not right
If you take away BGP, there is no Internet!
No other protocol in existence/use today can scale the way BGP has.
TCP connection setup is the lowest layer that makes it nontrivial to spoof a sender.
Trust has been broadly effective, but also quite damaging at times. It's part of why I'm glad https is nigh universal - http's trust allowed stuff like Firesheep and all the hotel shit-injection that used to be so prevalent.