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Re:Large-Scale BGP Hijack by booi on Sunday April 05, 2020 @10:46PM (#22790526)
It’s crazy to me that the fundamental protocol running the entire internet is essentially based on the honor system... it is not working out well
Re:Large-Scale BGP Hijack by q3k on Monday April 06, 2020 @05:00AM (#22791967)
Mostly in the US, where filters (if any) are set up by mailing eachother deadtree LOAs about party A allowing party B to announce their prefix. It's basically the checkbook way of doing things, but for BGP.

Meanwhile in EMEA we've been using IRR (and recently RPKI) for automating filters for years now. I couldn't do a BGP hijack through my EU upstreams even if I wanted to.

Re:Large-Scale BGP Hijack by dylz on Monday April 06, 2020 @01:53PM (#22796030)
RPKI in ARIN space is questionably annoying to do. I still haven't been able to add anything to my new allocations.

As a bonus, my US upstream doesn't care if I have RPKI/ROA/IRR - even if I do, they ask for dead tree LOA anyway.

When I sent a dead tree to one of my EU upstreams out of habit they were like "what do I need this for?"

Re:Large-Scale BGP Hijack by kitteh on Monday April 06, 2020 @02:22PM (#22796335)
ARINs RPKI APIs could use some love, that's for sure.
Re:Large-Scale BGP Hijack by tialaramex on Monday April 06, 2020 @01:05AM (#22791032)
The world's financial systems depend heavily on trust too.

Take credit cards. As an end user you perceive some fairly heavyweight albeit imperfect security, but in reality there are two parallel systems and only one of them is using those security features.

Authorisation is the part that ties your good name to your transactions. The bank doesn't trust you, so considerable technological effort is used in Authorisation. Chip cards, PINs, extra passwords and codes for web transactions, that's all Authorization.

Settlement moves money between your account and a merchant account. This isn't secured at all, it's just based on trust. Any merchant can assert that you used your card to pay them any amount and by default the bank takes it on trust.

Authorisation is abuse resistant. If you try to replay the same authorization multiple times it doesn't work.

Settlement doesn't care. If a worker messes up and puts a big merchant's daily settlement transactions through twice, every single one of those transactions just happens again. Paid $80 for groceries leaving $38 in the account until pay day? Sorry, now you're $42 overdrawn. This really happens.

If you complain they'll fix it. If hundreds of customers complain they'll realize the error and fix it for everyone. But this is why you have to check your credit card bill. Sooner or later there will be errors, and if you don't check you'll never see them which can get expensive fast.

Re:Large-Scale BGP Hijack by buran77 on Monday April 06, 2020 @05:40AM (#22792123)
On the other hand see how double spending works in less regulated financial markets like cryptocurrency. What keeps that honor system working in financial systems is that it's backed by strong regulation and strong supervisory authorities. There are so many controls built into this that mistakes happen less often than one might think, considering the volume of non-bank transactions (think billions++, yearly).

ISPs have noting of the kind. One routing mistake (or "mistake") and all of your customers' data suddenly went through China, Russia, US (you name it), for better or worse. What's worse, in a manner of speaking that data is now devalued. There's value date equivalent in the ISP's world. As a customer you have no avenues, the thing isn't even between you and any ISP you may work with. The bank will never get away with telling you "well we accidentally made this extra payment, it got routed thorough this extra bank, so now you lost 25% of the money".

Re:Large-Scale BGP Hijack by dx034 on Monday April 06, 2020 @01:22AM (#22791092)
Financial institutions are much more heavily regulated by governments than ISPs. The honor system in finance only works because regulators ensure (today more so than a few decades ago) that all players fulfill minimum requirements.
Re:Large-Scale BGP Hijack by danharaj on Sunday April 05, 2020 @11:33PM (#22790704)
All things considered it is working out pretty well.
Re:Large-Scale BGP Hijack by kitteh on Monday April 06, 2020 @10:38AM (#22794101)
Cogent and Level3 weren't filtering their own customer. This is what happens when large companies say prefix list updates / validation is too much of a burden and allow customers to run bareback BGP. That said, Cogent is going to be doing RPKI on customers soon so that's good.

As for Level 3 the world wonders.

Re:Large-Scale BGP Hijack by jlgaddis on Monday April 06, 2020 @07:20PM (#22798888)
Rostelecom (AS12389) is directly connected to Level3 (AS3356) and announced the hijacked routes to them but Level3 filtered them out.

But...

AS12389 announced them to Rascom (AS20764), who accepted them and sent them on to Cogent (AS174), who accepted them and propogated them on to Level3 (AS3356), who, unfortunately, then accepted them from Cogent.

The AS path would've been much longer than if Level3 had accepted them directly from AS12389 so, at the least, the actual effects of the hijacking weren't as bad as they could have been.

Re:Large-Scale BGP Hijack by kitteh on Monday April 06, 2020 @10:45PM (#22799910)
Problem is they were more specific prefixes for quite a few people and that trumps everything.
Re:Large-Scale BGP Hijack by jlgaddis on Tuesday April 07, 2020 @08:26AM (#22802528)
Ahhh, I missed that somehow. Looks like it was just a /24 here and there, though, out of much shorter prefixes, at least.
Re:Large-Scale BGP Hijack by commandlinefan on Monday April 06, 2020 @09:41AM (#22793596)
When the internet really started to become a big "thing" in the mid-90's and I started learning how it all worked I thought, "well, as soon as hackers realize how insecure this whole thing is, that'll be the end of that..."
Re:Large-Scale BGP Hijack by icedchai on Monday April 06, 2020 @09:28AM (#22793508)
It's actually working out amazing well, seeing it has barely changed in over 25 years!
Re:Large-Scale BGP Hijack by Icathian on Sunday April 05, 2020 @10:58PM (#22790587)
Border Gateway Protocol is just one routing protocol, calling it "the fundamental protocol" is stretching a point. That award probably goes to TCP. Maybe IPv4.
Re:Large-Scale BGP Hijack by kortilla on Monday April 06, 2020 @12:35AM (#22790927)
Border gateway protocol is the only routing protocol to get prefixes reachable to the wider internet.
Re:Large-Scale BGP Hijack by mox1 on Sunday April 05, 2020 @11:01PM (#22790599)
I mean no BGP no global internet...just local lans and wans.
Re:Large-Scale BGP Hijack by iso1210 on Monday April 06, 2020 @03:40AM (#22791614)
BGP didn't start major inroads into the internet until the mid 90s.

RIP can't cope with the scale of the internet today, but to say BGP is essential to interconnecting networks is not right

Re:Large-Scale BGP Hijack by jlgaddis on Monday April 06, 2020 @07:00PM (#22798724)
Huh?

If you take away BGP, there is no Internet!

No other protocol in existence/use today can scale the way BGP has.

Re:Large-Scale BGP Hijack by tlb on Sunday April 05, 2020 @11:00PM (#22790595)
IPv4 and v6 run on the honor system too, in that the sender can supply any source address they like.

TCP connection setup is the lowest layer that makes it nontrivial to spoof a sender.

Re:Large-Scale BGP Hijack by Groxx on Sunday April 05, 2020 @11:51PM (#22790780)
The ability to do this is effectively what enables DNS traffic amplification attacks (and others).

Trust has been broadly effective, but also quite damaging at times. It's part of why I'm glad https is nigh universal - http's trust allowed stuff like Firesheep and all the hotel shit-injection that used to be so prevalent.