I agree, but I think it's important to qualify what you mean when you say the "business can't survive". Because this implies that if a company can't meet its debt obligations that it will cease operations.
As long as operational cash flow is positive, then no amount of leverage or debt distress will halt the continued operations. The business might "fail" in the sense that the entity is legally re-structured and the equity owners, or even junior debt owners, are zeroed. But there's no reason in a country with well-developed bankruptcy law for this to have any impact on the employees, customers or operations of the business.
The issue with coronavirus and failing businesses is that it's causing many businesses to have negative operational cash flow. In this sense the business may fail and the operations discontinued simply because revenue is no longer exceeding expenses. But if the operations are cash flow negative (and capital markets are unwilling to extend financing in the hope of future cash flow) then the business will fail regardless of its capital structure or leverage.
You're naively assuming the equity owners meekly turnover the operations to the debtholders in bankruptcy when business performance suffers but cash flow is positive.
Equity holders are going to inflict a ton of pain on the employees and customers of the company first. They are going to layoff employees to the bare bones, sell otherwise performant assets, play games with vendors/receivables, and otherwise do anything else they can do to squeeze more runway before giving things up in bankruptcy.
Your assumption is kind of predicated on the belief that people lending to PE are making rational choices...they aren't.
The reason why LBOs took off was because S&Ls needed high-yield paper (and, to a lesser extent, there was a big buildup of Middle Eastern funds in US banks). All these deals allow the lender to risk up their portfolio, and take (in retrospect) equity risk. If you were an LBO firm, you can just sit there, create this paper...maybe it works out, it probably doesn't, and (tbh) you don't care because you get fees either way (most PE firms aren't really fund managers, they generate transaction fees for principals...that is why they employ bankers, instead of people with any experience of business). Btw, if this isn't convincing this same dynamic also caused a bubble in emerging market debt (i.e. banks needed high yield paper, bankers went to EM govts and got it).
And in a downturn, this process goes into reverse. People rush into cash, and sell whatever is liquid. It isn't anything close to rational (I feel like this should be obvious, I am seeing stocks with close to monopoly positioning selling at 3x earnings...is that rational?).
Now, the complexion of these deals has changed but what really drives finance is supply and demand. Another good example is CDOs, that was all supply-driven...banks wanted paper (there was a huge build up of dollars in exporters like Germany/Japan...China too but the state controlled dollars domestically), Basel rules meant there had to be some trickery i.e. banks needed to say CDOs were AAA but there was not enough AAA supply so CDOs had to convert junk into debt...but the point is...they needed the paper, so it was supplied. Totally irrational, no-one looked or cared about fundamentals but...the fundamentals don't really matter. Liquidity drives everything (if you have liquidity, you buy anything...if you don't, you sell anything).
Btw, understanding this is pretty key to successful investing. Once you realise what is occurring, investing is fairly straightforward. It is only when people try to introduce artificial concepts like rationality that they lose money in large sums.
This seems intuitively appealing, but is misleading. The Nobel-prize winning work of the Modigliani-Miller Theorem[1] that a firm's capital or leverage ratio does not prima facie have any impact on its weighted-average cost of capital.
I am unsure how this is different from the normal failure of leveraged firms. When so many are failing within 3 years in normal times, this just seems to be more of the same.
> For some years, these purchasers accurately called themselves “leveraged buyout firms.” When that term got a bad name in the early 1990s – remember RJR and Barbarians at the Gate? – these buyers hastily relabeled themselves “private-equity.” The name may have changed but that was all: Equity is dramatically reduced and debt is piled on in virtually all private-equity purchases. Indeed, the amount that a private-equity purchaser offers to the seller is in part determined by the buyer assessing the maximum amount of debt that can be placed on the acquired company.
> Later, if things go well and equity begins to build, leveraged buy-out shops will often seek to re-leverage with new borrowings. They then typically use part of the proceeds to pay a huge dividend that drives equity sharply downward, sometimes even to a negative figure. In truth, “equity” is a dirty word for many private-equity buyers; what they love is debt. And, because debt is currently so inexpensive, these buyers can frequently pay top dollar. Later, the business will be resold, often to another leveraged buyer. In effect, the business becomes a piece of merchandise.
Left unsaid is what happens if things do not go well. Saddled with as much debt as possible, the business by design has been put in a position such that it cannot survive even a modest decline in revenue without raising significant additional capital.
Therefore, if government assistance is not forthcoming, the economic shock of COVID-19 looks likely to put a majority of leveraged buyouts in bankruptcy.
[a] https://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2014ltr.pdf