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Re:Please consider not adopting Google WebComponents by smnthermes on Tuesday March 17, 2020 @04:37PM (#22610089)
> their binaries are built with no mitigations whatsoever. ASLR disabled, no stack canaries, no fortify.

Provide evidence.

Re:Please consider not adopting Google WebComponents by lima on Tuesday March 17, 2020 @04:53PM (#22610287)
Anyone can easily verify this by downloading the binaries, and running checksec themselves.

Here's the output:

    $ sha256sum palemoon-bin
    0b7f4ad73fc671e20bfb2366aa9d9ad81e82a3c8f63acde7f37063e73fda2141  palemoon-bin

    $ checksec --file=./palemoon-bin --output=json --extended | jq 
    {
      "./palemoon-bin": {
        "relro": "partial",
        "canary": "no",
        "nx": "yes",
        "pie": "no",
        "clangcfi": "no",
        "safestack": "no",
        "rpath": "no",
        "runpath": "no",
        "symbols": "no",
        "fortify_source": "no",
        "fortified": "0",
        "fortify-able": "15"
      }
    }
Notably, the binary has not been compiled with -fPIE and -fstack-protector, which disables two very basic exploit mitigations - ASLR and stack canaries. Any self-respecting Linux distribution enables these compiler flags by default nowadays. -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE is also missing, unlike Chrome or Firefox. A modern browser uses dozens of custom binary exploitation mitigations in addition to this.

Mitigations and sandboxing are the difference between an exploit a CTF player can write on an afternoon, and a multi-month expert-level endeavour.

Re:Please consider not adopting Google WebComponents by fouric on Tuesday March 17, 2020 @05:17PM (#22610559)
Which version is the `palemoon-bin` that you have there?
Re:Please consider not adopting Google WebComponents by eropple on Tuesday March 17, 2020 @05:22PM (#22610597)
It's 28.8.4 x64, downloaded straight from the website. (I duplicated his efforts; tbf, you could have, too.)