But an important part of that process is trying to determine if something works or not.
I'd say doing that well is difficult without at least some theory and hypothesis of how - because of the need to determine significant factors.
To take a silly example, you could take a group of diarrhea patients and serve some copious amounts of green tea, and another group a limited amount of water; you'd probably observere severe dehydration in the group that is served water. But it does not follow that green tea is better than water for treating diarrhea - sufficient hydration is.
> One could argue that science is about falsifying hypothesis - and terby narrowing in on not just if something works, but how.
To clarify, are YOU arguing that? Because if you're not arguing that, if you're just playing devil's advocate, then I'm unhappy with the way the conversation is going.
Testing "how" is not a requirement for science. There's been a lot of work on the philosophy of science over the past few centuries which I'm not going to try and summarize here (tl;dr: the idea of "falsifiability" is a bit outdated), but I'm going to copy and paste the first sentence of Wikipedia:
> Science is a systematic enterprise that builds and organizes knowledge in the form of testable explanations and predictions about the universe.
There's no requirement in science that we understand a mechanism of action.
My point about tea vs water is exactly that having: "a systematic enterprise that builds and organizes knowledge" helps with controlling for other factors when setting up and evaluating experiments?
Ed: hm, we may be talking past each other here:
> Testing "how" is not a requirement for science
Indeed, 'testing "how"' isn't really possible, only testing "if". But testing "if" with no idea of "how" is very difficult? (because without an idea of "how" it's hard to even define the "what")
It says "and predictions". That is, both "testable explanations" and "testable predictions" are a part of science.
> Indeed, 'testing "how"' isn't really possible, only testing "if".
This argument is a dead end. If you construct your epistemology in such a fragile way that testing "how" is not possible, then take a closer look at the world you've constructed, you'll find that testing "if" is not possible either.
Any modern philosophy of science has to reconcile with modern epistemology. If you try to construct a good definition for science but use your intuition about what "knowledge" is, then you're only going to discover that you need to go back and refine your understanding of epistemology.
I claim that we can, in fact, test "how".
Testing "how" and testing "whether" are both scientific endeavors.
> One could argue that science is about falsifying hypothesis - and terby narrowing in on not just if something works, but how.
You read that as saying that we can only test how, not if. Now you read my comments as saying we can only test if not how.
I think we're in agreement that they are two sides of the scientific process.
The original sentence, "One could argue that..." is poorly worded and confusing. Maybe you could take this opportunity to clarify what you meant.
I'm not really interested in litigating who said what. I'd rather understand what you actually mean, rather than try and attack the wording that you happened to use.
To clarify what I'm saying: Testing "whether" can be science, without testing "how", and vice versa.
Testing the "if" is science - but difficult without a framework helping understand "how". Testing only if, in a vacuum, isn't enough - and it is a tool on the path to understanding "how". This allows such things as using statistical models (if one has an idea of distribution, for example) to help refine the "if" tests, and narrow down exactly what your "if" experiment tested.
I don't think you can have science without both, and I think defining a body of theory is the more important aspect.
I get in discussions about philosophy of science all the time because I am passionate about it. But I am very disappointed because it turns out that other people who are passionate about science and the philosophy of science haven't really done the reading. This discussion is a prime example.
It makes me feel like nothing more than a conduit, copying arguments out of old books and pasting them on the internet.
Science doesn't always tell us why something works, but it may tell us "whether". The theory of whether something works is much easier to understand and test than the theory of why or how.
It may not be rigorous science with good experimental design, that's all.