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Re:Popular iPhone and iPad Apps Snooping on the Pasteboard by _bxg1 on Friday March 13, 2020 @06:16PM (#22571359)
> Apps on iOS and iPadOS have unrestricted access to the system-wide general pasteboard, also referred to as the clipboard.

Yikes. This is horrible, and really it's unacceptable given Apple's privacy rhetoric. Even the web doesn't have this vulnerability. And it's easy to fix, too! Why in the world should an app be able to see the clipboard? It should only see the text I enter into its fields (via pasting or otherwise).

Re:Popular iPhone and iPad Apps Snooping on the Pasteboard by katsura on Friday March 13, 2020 @06:48PM (#22571550)
Browsers use it to help you with the copied links. When you click into the URL bar they offer you to jump to the previously copied link right away.
Re:Popular iPhone and iPad Apps Snooping on the Pasteboard by cortesoft on Friday March 13, 2020 @10:37PM (#22572717)
I think just saying "paste and go" is fine, they don't need to know where it is going before I click yes
Re:Popular iPhone and iPad Apps Snooping on the Pasteboard by aaomidi on Friday March 13, 2020 @07:58PM (#22571913)
Should be a permission.
Re:Popular iPhone and iPad Apps Snooping on the Pasteboard by toyg on Friday March 13, 2020 @08:18PM (#22571989)
I don’t disagree but the overflowing of permission prompts is how we get people just clicking Yes to everything. There is a balance. Location services are worth of a permission, but the clipboard seems a bit on the trivial side of things. Then again, people paste passwords, so...
Re:Popular iPhone and iPad Apps Snooping on the Pasteboard by bigiain on Friday March 13, 2020 @09:37PM (#22572436)
> Then again, people paste passwords, so.

It’s more serious than that, current security best practice is telling everybody to use a password manager. People are being told that pasting passwords is “the right way to do things”. And that behaviour (at least for me) has morphed into keeping account numbers, credit card numbers, and other important private information in the password manager, and copy pasting those when I need to.

(1Password on Mac seems to have a trick where it empties the clipboard after a certain amount of time, I’ve noticed that occasionally when a password I’d copied a little while ago isn’t still in the clipboard when I try to paste it. I haven’t been quite curious enough to look into it. Yet...)

Re:Popular iPhone and iPad Apps Snooping on the Pasteboard by saagarjha on Saturday March 14, 2020 @02:01AM (#22573502)
Re:Popular iPhone and iPad Apps Snooping on the Pasteboard by Marsymars on Friday March 13, 2020 @11:21PM (#22572933)
> 1Password on Mac seems to have a trick where it empties the clipboard after a certain amount of time, I’ve noticed that occasionally when a password I’d copied a little while ago isn’t still in the clipboard when I try to paste it. I haven’t been quite curious enough to look into it. Yet...

I think this is pretty standard. KeePass makes it immediately obvious as it has a bar on the bottom of the window that starts a 12-second decrement when you copy a password.

Re:Popular iPhone and iPad Apps Snooping on the Pasteboard by walterbell on Friday March 13, 2020 @08:21PM (#22572005)
The permissions can be unidrectional, e.g. password manager grants permission to a specific app for the next N seconds. Similar to "add photo" permission.
Re:Popular iPhone and iPad Apps Snooping on the Pasteboard by saagarjha on Saturday March 14, 2020 @01:43AM (#22573443)
How would the password manager know which app you’re going to paste the password into?
Re:Popular iPhone and iPad Apps Snooping on the Pasteboard by walterbell on Monday March 16, 2020 @12:59PM (#22594524)
The OS could provide a whitelisting API and an "app picker" to the user. The password manager app itself need not know the destination app, the OS could manage the binding. The password manager could invoke an OS API to create each association, with user-OS input for app selection. This whitelist approach would be similar to SE Linux or other mandatory access control systems.

This kind of inter-app policy could also be useful for opening URLs, e.g. open all URLs from untrusted app A in Brave browser where Javascript can be easily whitelisted on a per-site basis.