Decoherence or more strongly environmental super-selection from something like electromagnetic scattering, results in a Classical probability distribution over the macroscopic observables or more accurately renders the algebra of classical properties Boolean. This means there is no interference between the terms and the probabilities are simply ignorance of facts which have occurred.
Once this superselection process has occurred the mathematical structure of macroscopic observables is just as it is in classical statistical mechanics. There's no need to read this as multiple worlds, although you can if you want to. If interference terms persisted you might have more of a case for Many Worlds. Even then though there are other ways of reading the formalism.
Decoherence doesn't give you single outcomes, but it gives you a classical probability distribution (like an enthropic ensemble) over pure quantum states, with the pure quantum states having reduced coherence (i.e. they 'look classical').
Classical probability distributions are nothing new, we don't need a many worlds interpretation to explain the butterfly effect.
Quantum states with a small amount of residual superposition also seem fine to me, as long as you are willing to accept that the world is ultimately quantum and not classical. That we don't see any quantum effects in daily life is just because the scales are too small, similar to how we don't observe relativistic effects because the scales are too large, or how we don't observe the atomicity of water. But in all these cases we can do experiments to reveal the true nature.
But at no point does one world even approximately emerge - it’s always many. I can say only the one I experience is real, but there’s no justification for it.
Your main problem though is thinking classically - you can't justify your theory by saying it can be reduced (after an infinite amount of time) to an old way of thinking. Classical probability is fraught with issues; just saying it’s always been acceptable isn’t true nor a rational argument.
And people do debate how to derive our single world experience from many worlds. It can’t be done without more assumptions.
Many in this field do accept it, but say the other worlds are not real (QBism, dBB).
But that position is philosophically weak, so those against many worlds still look for alternatives.