The 2 players here are the government, and the voters. The socially optimal scenario is action REGARDLESS of whether it's a pandemic or not (in a hyper-globalized world it would hurt a bit, but only the first time, after that the tourists, supply chains, etc. would adapt) but the voters penalize that outcome (they see action with no pandemic as overreaction not as successful prevention) so governments avoid it.
The question here is which actions of what severity, not simple act or not.
There are many ways to handle this, from maximum quarantine and cancellation of medical appointments, through closing mass gatherings (e.g. schools), rationing, enforced testing, closing public transportation, controlling private transportation, closing airports, sea and river ports, mandatory sampling for tests etc.
Each choice comes with a value for disruption and voter groups it will affect, and value for monetary cost.
Game theory is not too helpful here, as disruption does not directly affect discontent and definitely not your chances of getting elected. These are much more complex decisions with many more actions between here and then.
It is simply up to the government to estimate probability and expected payoff. Optimal action for government is to take the least amount of action to prevent the voters from thinking its a pandemic. It isn't a game theory scenario, there are no nash equilibria.
Instead governments are weighing the probabilities (think a probability tree, according to your scenarios) you kind of point to this in your conclusion.