But as the example shows, a practice's rationale is generally not related to the function served by the practice. Even if a practice is adopted for straightforward reasons and more or less fulfills its intended purpose with few side effects, over time other practices will come to depend on that one in unclear ways. Where should that be written down?
There is certainly the temptation to engage in the naturalistic fallacy (i.e. "just because something is natural that it is therefore necessarily moral").
At the base of it, evo-psych rests on the premise that for a behavior to persist, it must have a purpose. Asking what that purpose is, without ascribing a value judgement, seems like a reasonable avenue of inquiry.
This conflicts with the broader understanding of evolution in general, which treats "selection" (changes that have a purpose) and "genetic drift" (changes that have no purpose) separately.
A more correct way would be the changes that improve the chances of survival and procreation, and changes that don't but persist because they at least don't decrease those chances.
My point was more that with evo psych, you can additionally declare almost any behaviour to be "natural" by coming up with some convoluted reasoning why it confers an evolutionary advantage.