Re:Can we stop Covid-19 using Bluetooth?
by thanksforfish on Tuesday March 10, 2020 @12:09PM
(#22536664)
Ah good point about overlapping location data for sick users, that would add ambiguity.
This approach still puts a lot of trust in the server. Every client needs to upload their hashes to the server, so if the group running the server wanted to reverse the hashes they'd get everyone's location, not just sick people. The server would also know which hashes were popular, indicating that they are crowded areas like a city or event center. From a tracking perspective the fact that two people were in the same location is useful to start making inferences, even if the location isn't known.
I think it would be pretty impractical to brute force all possible space-time blocks. Even if you just wanted to look at the state of California over 24 hours you're looking at 1.0952599e+12 hashes [0]. Say your rig can try 500k hashes a second, that's still almost a month. So now you know the rough locations of every infected person in California over the course of one day, you still have to disentangle the movements of overlapping users. You can make this even harder by requiring people to loiter in a space box for a minimum amount of time before creating an entry, so travel by bike/train/plane/automobile wont be tracked at all.
Clearly the scheme is resistant against mass de-anonymization, but if you knew some specific locations where you thought a specific person might go you could target those space-boxes and, assuming there are not many other infected users in the area, get a sense of when that person was at those places.
[0] 163,696 sq miles = 4.563583e+12 sqft = 45,635,830,000 100sqft space boxes * 24 = 1.0952599e+12