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Re:Uncovering the CIA's Crypto AG operation by atoav on Friday March 06, 2020 @01:38AM (#22501431)
Still, given the extraordinary claims the proof on Huawei seems to be spread thin. I know they "theoretically could" surveill everything, but actual proof isn't really there (yet) afaik and this while there are parties with considerable interest to proof their wrongdoing.

Which leaves three explainations:

1. The chinese are so good the 5 eyes can't proof it

2. The 5 eyes can proof it but don't dare to for certain reasons (which wont stop independend researchers)

3. It doesn't actually happen (yet)

Meanwhile we've got tons of actual backdoors from the US side.

Re:Uncovering the CIA's Crypto AG operation by whatshisface on Friday March 06, 2020 @08:20AM (#22503299)
4. The 5 eyes have some evidence that somehow China is reading their communications, and they're scared sick but they can't catch them doing it.
Re:Uncovering the CIA's Crypto AG operation by csharptwdec19 on Friday March 06, 2020 @11:52AM (#22505093)
The PLA members being charged with the Equifax hack to me was a statement that they probably -do- know some things but do not wish the political turmoil that would result.
Re:Uncovering the CIA's Crypto AG operation by wahern on Friday March 06, 2020 @02:40PM (#22506555)
But what does that have to do with Huawei and 5G? The Equifax exfiltration exploited bugs in an internet-facing Java application. Likewise for previous incidents, such as the exfiltration of data from the Office of Personnel Management. In both those cases and others the U.S. government publicly fingered China. Publishing technical details wouldn't have created any additional political turmoil, and in fact some technical details were published.

The U.S. government could divulge credible information about a particular Huawei attack, especially if it were as pervasive as they seem to claim. I can think of many reasons why they wouldn't do this (e.g. exploits make more than just Huawei look bad, such as other American suppliers), but few that bolster their case against Huawei as a distinct threat to telecommunications security.

Rather, it seems their beef with Huawei is two-fold: 1) generalized national security interest in preventing China from dominating the telecommunications market (i.e. concern over relative tactical and strategic positions of China and U.S. SIGINT capabilities), and 2) protecting the profit margins of Qualcomm and other American suppliers.