Webauthn was weirdly impractical when I looked at it.

For example, the private key gets stored in hardware protection thus cannot be exported. So the UX is a non-starter if the user wants to log in from more than one device.

People will say that's a feature. But it's also why it's never going to replace passwords.

In a typical WebAuthn scenario the Private Key is actually being stored by the Relying Party, they just don't know that because it's encrypted with a symmetric key. That symmetric key is baked inside the hardware token.

Yes I'll say not being able to get that symmetric key out of the hardware token is a feature, because it is. Without that feature you'll have to educate users about how to care for their symmetric key and every time you inevitably fail they get exploited.

You can register multiple hardware tokens for a service (if the site supports that).

Regarding export of private keys -- some crypto hardware wallets also support the FIDO[2] specs. -- so there you have the option to use the 12 words to setup a new hardware with the same private keys ...

this really isn't the best thread to ask, but I've been quite curious if there are any other, less secure, key stores under consideration (i.e a filesystem or remote sso service) under CTAP?