Wouldn't an artificially high price of carbon emissions be quite a bit better than an artificially low one?
I'd be more sympathetic to your externalities argument if there was some evidence that you weren't just using it as an excuse to do what you want to do for other reasons.
For example, you're ignoring the negative externalities of your proposal.
And then there's the small matter that the predicted cost of the externalities is significantly lower than cost of the "solution". Money has positive time value.
What? You don't like numerical arguments? Or, is it that you didn't know that the numbers existed?
> Wouldn't an artificially high price of carbon emissions be quite a bit better than an artificially low one?
No. Or rather, it depends on the magnitudes of "high" and "low".
Most folks who complain about subidized energy miscount. Feel free to demonstrate that you'r an exception.
Most of the "economies of scale" happen at a fairly modest level. In fact, there are actually diseconomies at extreme scale. (The US Govt is a nice example.)
> The problem is that if only one state does this at significant expense, they won't see any appreciable benefit
The claim was that the expense wasn't significant, that it was mostly just "will".
> if we use a cap or a carbon tax to price non renewables appropriately
And what makes you think that the price will be "appropriate"?
The arguments for carbon taxes and the like are comparing an abstract ideal with what we got through the political process. That's a meaningless comparison because that processh pretty much guarantees that the nice properties of the ideal won't be realized if we try to implement it.
When a proposal contains basic errors like those mentioned above, what are the odds that the rest of it is sound?