Tough--they should have to rewire the plane.
They cut the corner (or missed the corner) and got caught. Too bad, so sad. Maybe fire a bunch of executives this time and I might have some more sympathy later.
> For once, I think Boeing does have a point here. This is the same wiring used on the 737NG, which AFAIK is considered the safest (or one of the safest, at least) airliner ever. The point about rerouting existing wiring introducing it's own potential hazard also seems like an entirely reasonable consideration.
"Nothing happened before" does not obviate the analysis that caused the rule to be created.
Aerospace rules are generally written in blood. Ignoring them tends to spill more blood.
This is exactly the kind of issue where your reputation is crucial. If your reputation is sterling, then nobody would blink about cutting you slack in this single instance. If, however, your reputation is such that there are likely even more instances like this that haven't been found, then you should get held to the letter of the law.
You missed the point. It's not about the money, it's that rewiring might actually be less safe.
No, I didn't. That's what Boeing claims by attempting to extrapolate the safety record of a plane built under previous Boeing management who had safety as priority one to the safety record of the current plane built under Boeing/McDonnell management that prioritized money over safety.
The problem is that the previous wiring might be safe given that all the surrounding systems are also built to the same safety standard as the previous 737. Unfortunately, we have plenty of evidence that the surrounding systems probably are not built to the same standard.
In addition, the airplanes responsible for this rule coming into being didn't have a safety problem either--until they suddenly did.
It's not that the planes developed a safety problem - it's that we learned that the wires being that close is a bad idea and that all planes built after we realized that should not make the same mistake.
How much risk, I don't know. But slavishley following rules without bothering to understand them isn't a good idea.
Either those wires are safe, so leave them, or they are not, so rewire 6,000 grandfathered planes.
Doing some sort of hybrid where you rewire these planes, but not those, just based on the name, isn't logical.
The MAXes where built after the regulation came into place therefore you better build it in. The same way you can't sell a new car without safety belts.
Even if the FAA cuts Boeing some slack here (which they shouldn't - these are safety rules that exist because hundreds of people had horrific deaths), the EASA will certainly not.
If the FAA accepts Boeing's excuse, they both would be liable in case the wiring causes an accident in the future, since both would have been negligent and knew fully well the wiring was not up to current standards.
Of course they knew.
But it also seems that the old wiring design has been verified by the test of time and they have data showing the crashes weren't related to it.
So I think that ripping out all of the wiring on the planes and rushing to replace it with a new system, then rushing to test that new system, is the surest way to increase the likelihood of another system failure and possibly even kill off the Boeing brand if that happens.
I know it's automatic that we assume Boeing is either nefarious or retarded in everything they do, but it's hard to see this as that big a deal when considering the bigger picture.