Re:Did the early internet activists blow it?
by jancsika on Saturday February 15, 2020 @11:30PM
(#22339782)
> We have a right to exist too.
You do.
On a separate note:
1. From a technical point of view it's poorly-designed software for 2020. For example: you can't measure how many of "we" are refrigerators. You apparently don't reflect about how that may open up exploits to a wide variety of attackers in "their own space" for the "anything goes" crowd. (Same for HN for that matter.)
2. From a practical point of view this type of software serves as a poor entry point for a persuasive free speech argument. I much prefer using E2EE messaging apps as the entry point for a strong defense of free speech in the digital era. We know bad actors have used them and will likely use them in the future. Nonetheless, the rest of us use them and will fight to continue to do so on principle (e.g., for security in a weaponized internet, for privacy, for research purposes, etc.). Those principles are at the forefront, as is the fear that will be used in the counter-argument and which we must resist. We know the value, we know the cost, and we can argue the point clearly.
If we instead start the argument with poorly designed, buggy software that requires a birds-eye view of the network in order to properly assess when and how it's being exploited we're going to be fighting on two fronts. (As well as ignoring the risks of the design as I believe your comment does.)
You do.
On a separate note:
1. From a technical point of view it's poorly-designed software for 2020. For example: you can't measure how many of "we" are refrigerators. You apparently don't reflect about how that may open up exploits to a wide variety of attackers in "their own space" for the "anything goes" crowd. (Same for HN for that matter.)
2. From a practical point of view this type of software serves as a poor entry point for a persuasive free speech argument. I much prefer using E2EE messaging apps as the entry point for a strong defense of free speech in the digital era. We know bad actors have used them and will likely use them in the future. Nonetheless, the rest of us use them and will fight to continue to do so on principle (e.g., for security in a weaponized internet, for privacy, for research purposes, etc.). Those principles are at the forefront, as is the fear that will be used in the counter-argument and which we must resist. We know the value, we know the cost, and we can argue the point clearly.
If we instead start the argument with poorly designed, buggy software that requires a birds-eye view of the network in order to properly assess when and how it's being exploited we're going to be fighting on two fronts. (As well as ignoring the risks of the design as I believe your comment does.)