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Re:Mac OS Catalina: more trouble than it’s worth (Part 2) by chalst on Friday February 14, 2020 @02:05AM (#22324553)
Also worth reading John Gruber's complaints, over and above bugs:

> But I don’t know a single expert Mac user who is not seriously annoyed by the heavy-handed security design of Catalina. Not one. Every single expert user I know is annoyed. That is a bad place for MacOS to be. MacOS 10.16 needs a serious course correction to fix this, and if 10.16 goes the opposite way — growing even more heavy-handed in restricting professional Mac users from just using their machines as they want and expect to — I genuinely fear for the future of the Mac as a platform for serious computer users.

https://daringfireball.net/2020/02/my_2019_apple_report_card

Re:Mac OS Catalina: more trouble than it’s worth (Part 2) by musicale on Friday February 14, 2020 @02:28AM (#22324668)
I'm kind of OK with "macOS Vista."

I've wanted more restrictive and granular permissions for a long time. Web browsers don't need unrestricted access to the entire file system. Neither do games. Preview doesn't need to access the microphone. Word doesn't usually need to record the screen. PowerPoint should not be sending email or accessing the camera. TextEdit doesn't need access to my contacts or calendar. And I don't want any of these programs interrupting me with stupid notifications. Maybe some people want to give these extra permissions, but I want them to be off by default.

My complaint is that permissions don't go far enough; for example I never want to be interrupted by software update notifications, but there's no way to turn them off.

Re:Mac OS Catalina: more trouble than it’s worth (Part 2) by asveikau on Friday February 14, 2020 @10:26AM (#22327319)
People cite the browser a lot and I think it is the most important case because it runs untrusted javascript. So an exploitable browser bug maybe shouldn't have all these permissions without asking. OTOH the browser should apply such mitigations voluntarily.
Re:Mac OS Catalina: more trouble than it’s worth (Part 2) by vmchale on Friday February 14, 2020 @11:27AM (#22327840)
> I'm kind of OK with "macOS Vista." I've wanted more restrictive and granular permissions for a long time.

I'd prefer sensible (silent) defaults, such as disabling PowerPoint's access to my webcam.

Re:Mac OS Catalina: more trouble than it’s worth (Part 2) by hhas01 on Friday February 14, 2020 @06:34AM (#22325734)
Just about everything you said there is wrong. Hey, don’t get me wrong: if you enjoy 10.15’s tedious security-theatre crap then knock yourself out. But you are not qualified to dictate what other users need or want to do; only they are.

Like Apple, you are thinking App-centrically. Stop. Apps are not the center of the users’ universe. The users’ own tasks are.

Therefore you need to think task-centrically—i.e. What does the user need/want to do?—and structure your security model to enable and support that.

Re:Mac OS Catalina: more trouble than it’s worth (Part 2) by artimaeis on Friday February 14, 2020 @08:54AM (#22326492)
You're right that tasks are the center of the user's universe. But it's generally not tasks that infect a device with malware. It's malicious applications that do that.

This is the case on _every_ OS that lets users install applications.

So, how can we make sure users doing tasks aren't afflicted by applications that want to sneak in? You're saying to "structure a security model differently" leads me to think maybe users shouldn't have admin access on the machine? But then you get all the critiques people have of iOS.

I'm honestly asking, what's the alternative here?

Re:Mac OS Catalina: more trouble than it’s worth (Part 2) by hhas01 on Friday February 14, 2020 @12:39PM (#22328397)
See my other post here. There will always be desktop malware; what really matters is that it is contained and has no access to sensitive information.

Locking down the entire UX doesn’t work because day-to-day operations become onerous while the constant spew of “Are you sure?” dialogs teaches users to click OK without thinking.

Instead, put the sensitive stuff into its own “secure desktop”, and police all movements between that and the “standard desktop”. Even stick in an “unsafe desktop” for doing risky stuff, and encourage users to install new/untrusted software there; e.g. let them install and run anything without nagging, but keep apps completely sandboxed. Boundaries should be clearly delimited, e.g. give the high-security desktop its own window chrome and fixed background image that can’t be mimicked on the others.

It’s deliberately coarse-grained, unlike the current mess, and that’s the point. That makes it easy for users to mentally model and match scopes to tasks, and limits nagging to where it really matters: when crossing scope boundaries with data in tow. Simply switching scopes and working within a scope should not nag, however.

Look, I’m not saying it’s guaranteed to work. But at least I’m thinking about it from the point of view of end-users, not vendor developers and lawyers. It’d need prototyped and tested in both lab and real world, and sure as guns users will discover exciting new ways to screw things up; which means learning and adapting to account for that.

But that’s UX. Either do it right, or go get a job flipping burgers where the worst you’ll do is hospitalize a few dozen locals with E. Coli. TWO BILLION now trust large chunks of their lives to their “personal” machines. That is a lot of people to screw up.

Re:Mac OS Catalina: more trouble than it’s worth (Part 2) by syntheticcdo on Friday February 14, 2020 @02:17AM (#22324611)
> there should be a single switch for expert users to toggle to effectively say “I trust all of the software on my Mac”.

As an "expert" software engineer, I completely trust absolutely zero software running on my computer, in my browser, or basically on any device anywhere. I begrudgingly put up with it all because there is no alternative. Adding friction is good because it will eventually push (force?) developers to use more modern, safer development patterns.

Re:Mac OS Catalina: more trouble than it’s worth (Part 2) by robenkleene on Friday February 14, 2020 @06:16AM (#22325647)
That it will force developers to safer development patterns has demonstrably not been the case. When comparing the success of apps that work within Apple's sandboxing restrictions in the App Store versus apps that are outside of the App Store, that are not sandboxed, the ones outside the App Store and the sandbox are so much more popular that the sandboxed ones might as well not even exist[0]. Consumer's do not use sandboxed apps when there are more powerful equivalents that are not sandboxed.

[0]: https://blog.robenkleene.com/2019/08/07/apples-app-stores-ha...

Re:Mac OS Catalina: more trouble than it’s worth (Part 2) by frankchn on Friday February 14, 2020 @03:15AM (#22324866)
Adding friction will more likely resulting in most users blindly giving permissions to anything that asks for it. We’ve seen this before with the endless UAC dialogs in Windows Vista.
Re:Mac OS Catalina: more trouble than it’s worth (Part 2) by Wowfunhappy on Friday February 14, 2020 @11:00AM (#22327603)
What if I wrote the software?

I have a bunch of Applescripts which start with:

    tell application (path to frontmost application) to
...so they can control whatever is on screen at the time.

Since Mojave, any time a new application happens to be in front, I get prompted to give Bash permission to control that app. And then the entire set of approved apps seems to get wiped sometimes when I edit the Applescripts. There's no way to approve apps ahead of time, and there's no way to blanket approve control of any app.

Re:Mac OS Catalina: more trouble than it’s worth (Part 2) by hhas01 on Friday February 14, 2020 @12:55PM (#22328552)
“What if I wrote the software?”

Good point. Apple doesn’t care. If they did, they would’ve put some fricking effort into it. Not only is 10.15’s “Automation” security model pathetically thin and annoying (I’ve used those APIs; they’re crap), it doesn’t even protect users as it claims.

Allowed a script running in Terminal.app permission to access your Contacts? Great, now ANY script that runs in Terminal can do whatever it likes to your address book.

Once again, anything that does not fit cleanly into Apple’s naive App-centric model gets neglected, overlooked, or stomped on.

Honestly, I think now they’re just waiting for AppleScript usage to die out on its own, so they can kill off the old and crusty (but very powerful) Apple event IPC system entirely. So it goes.

--

TL;DR: Apple is in the commercial business of selling Apps. So where’s the benefit to them in you making your own?

:(

Re:Mac OS Catalina: more trouble than it’s worth (Part 2) by Mindwipe on Friday February 14, 2020 @03:14AM (#22324859)
> Adding friction is good because it will eventually push (force?) developers to use more modern, safer development patterns.

Or more likely it forces the retirement of known good software, and requires you to use unknown, newer tools that have had much less time for security and behaviour auditing my the general community over the years.

Re:Mac OS Catalina: more trouble than it’s worth (Part 2) by ashleyw on Sunday February 16, 2020 @02:12AM (#22340292)
You can effectively do that by disabling SIP. I did it a few weeks ago while debugging an issue with my WiFi card (because apparently we’re no longer allowed to view the logs on our own computers..)

I haven’t reenabled it yet, and I don’t think I will be doing for the time being. Apple’s gone too far here. Protect me, sure. Make me take an extra step to run an unsigned binary. For critical modifications like installing kernel extensions, make me run a terminal command, that’s fine. These measures would assist me in maintaining my own security, and they certainly shield my computer illiterate mother. But treat me like a hostile actor on my own computer and strip me of my superuser privileges? No.

I’d rather be a pirate than join the Navy.

Re:Mac OS Catalina: more trouble than it’s worth (Part 2) by jcelerier on Friday February 14, 2020 @03:02AM (#22324804)
Like what ? A software i develop needs to hide and move the mouse cursor at some point (To create an infinite zoom effect in a timeline as is common in media software). If the user clicks on "no" by reflex on the security popup when they first click on the scrollbar, a very very basic functionality of the software won't work and people won't have any idea why - best case is i get bug reports (and I got a few), worst case is bad press about shipping broken software. How would anything improve security here.
Re:Mac OS Catalina: more trouble than it’s worth (Part 2) by wasdfff on Friday February 14, 2020 @03:47PM (#22330245)
Plus if someone did download something malicious, they will still click yes to all permissions
Re:Mac OS Catalina: more trouble than it’s worth (Part 2) by kitsunesoba on Friday February 14, 2020 @10:51AM (#22327528)
Yes, it’s because of this that I leave SIP enabled even though it can occasionally be annoying. Running without SIP feels like being naked, because you really can’t trust third party software any more — even if the app itself isn’t doing something shady, someone somewhere is using a hole in it to do something shady.
Re:Mac OS Catalina: more trouble than it’s worth (Part 2) by Wowfunhappy on Friday February 14, 2020 @11:01AM (#22327613)
Note that without SIP, you still have all the protections of the normal vs root user account. The key is to be careful when entering your admin password. This is no different than most Linux installations (although a few systems of course have their own extra hardening mechanisms).
Re:Mac OS Catalina: more trouble than it’s worth (Part 2) by spoondan on Friday February 14, 2020 @02:16AM (#22324602)
There’s an important point to be made here about the gap between theoretical and practical security. Overly elaborate password policies (excessive complexity demands, passwords expiring, no reusing last five passwords) end up causing annoyed users to make bad decisions that compromise password security.

Similarly, an excess of popups doesn’t increase security. It annoys users to the point they stop thinking about individual security decisions.

There’s an important intersection of security research and HCI that doesn’t get discussed as much as it needs to be.

Re:Mac OS Catalina: more trouble than it’s worth (Part 2) by SkyMarshal on Friday February 14, 2020 @03:11AM (#22324850)
>Overly elaborate password policies (excessive complexity demands, passwords expiring, no reusing last five passwords) end up causing annoyed users to make bad decisions that compromise password security.

Similarly, an excess of popups doesn’t increase security. It annoys users to the point they stop thinking about individual security decisions.

It's particularly annoying b/c there's a subset of craftsmen developers who pay close attention to this problem, who realize these cures are worse than the disease, and who reverted years ago to not using these flawed security patterns. Many here on HN, for example.

And then there are Apple engineers who seem to be so far behind the curve that they're just now discovering and implementing patterns that others not only discovered and tested years ago, but discarded years ago.

It's like corporate 9-to-5'ers with no pride of craftsmanship or motivation to stay current with their field made these decisions. Either that or clueless management ordered it, which in any other company besides Apple would be my first guess.

Re:Mac OS Catalina: more trouble than it’s worth (Part 2) by hhas01 on Friday February 14, 2020 @06:36AM (#22325752)
“And then there are Apple engineers who seem to be so far behind the curve that they're just now discovering and implementing patterns that others not only discovered and tested years ago, but discarded years ago.”

QFT. Because there are not enough upvotes in all the world.

Re:Mac OS Catalina: more trouble than it’s worth (Part 2) by DelightOne on Friday February 14, 2020 @06:23AM (#22325686)
What is the alternative to popups here?
Re:Mac OS Catalina: more trouble than it’s worth (Part 2) by htfu on Friday February 14, 2020 @04:54AM (#22325295)
Isn't this something (likely even more) granularity ought to counteract something fierce?

The annoyance is still there/potentially larger, but it's easier to make an informed decision about something specific, rather than the usual "enter your admin password to allow... potentially anything, probably persistently. Or don't, then no app for you." binary which seems easier to just blindly go along with, since auditing is the only way to find out what exactly the privileges are for.

The question is rather where sheer request volume overwhelms gains from actually knowing what's being asked for, but better tools letting user set a base comfort level as far as common requests like disk access etc should help with that.

I am however struggling to articulate my opinion in a way that doesn't boil down to essentially "the issue with the dreaded Vista popup was that there weren't ten different varieties!", heh. Nah, just comes down to asking once vs. every time.

Re:Mac OS Catalina: more trouble than it’s worth (Part 2) by mikenew on Friday February 14, 2020 @02:39AM (#22324718)
One thing that drives me nuts is the way you get a security popup when you're working in a terminal. So you're ssh'd into a mac, you try to do something (like xcodebuild or whatever), and then it just sits there doing nothing while it waits for you to put in a password on a window you can't see.

It's not exactly new in Catalina, but it's worse. Apple just does not even think about the fact that you might want to do things remotely or automatically.

Re:Mac OS Catalina: more trouble than it’s worth (Part 2) by htfu on Friday February 14, 2020 @05:23AM (#22325406)
Yup. Or even just popups originally appearing behind other windows and missed. Or accidentally clicking the wrong option, or as with Mojave when apps requesting to record sound couldn't successfully trigger the popup in many cases.

The execution is where Apple is fucking up, yet people are hating on the concept, as if poor UX is somehow mandatory for something like this. Worries me a bit.

Re:Mac OS Catalina: more trouble than it’s worth (Part 2) by nomel on Friday February 14, 2020 @01:33PM (#22328916)
This is like having a firewall and getting upset that it's not passing everything through.

I believe there should absolutely be intentional, physical, steps to allow full remote access. Intentionally setting the terminal for full disk access is no less crazy than intentionally exposing a port through your firewall.

Re:Mac OS Catalina: more trouble than it’s worth (Part 2) by mikenew on Friday February 14, 2020 @03:15PM (#22329942)
Yeah a firewall where you open a port, but have to plug a monitor and keyboard into your router every time you want to use it.

I'm not "upset" that it needs authorization. I think it's a design flaw that you can't do it via a terminal, you don't even know that that's why your process has stalled, and you have to click a box every time.

Re:Mac OS Catalina: more trouble than it’s worth (Part 2) by hhas01 on Friday February 14, 2020 @06:23AM (#22325689)
Retrofitting user-centric security model onto an OS and application ecosystem that wasn’t designed for it and has grown up without it was always going to be a giant ballache. There’s no way around the pain. The old “fortress wall” model is worse than useless now that the user’s desktop is itself an untrusted environment.

The problem I see with these current changes is that they appear to be reactive—“X, Y, and Z are potential threat vectors, so we need to lock those down”—rather than taking the long view—“what does the future security model need to look like and do?”—and plot a clear, reasoned course to that from where we are now.

The result is an Application-level security model, when what users need is Task-level security. Users still get all of the pain of change, yet none of the intended benefits—all that’s happened is we’ve gone from one unfit-for-purpose platform to another.

For instance, just consider high-security operations such as internet banking. No way on Earth should we be using the same web browser application for sensitive financials as we use for reading all the daily gossip, browsing teh prawns, etc. Split that out into a dedicated, hardened version with no support for extensions, external automation, and its own isolated password managment. Whitelist security-sensitive URLs so that they open in that version, and restrict opening common-or-garden URLs to the low-security version only.

Isolating sensitive User Tasks within their own “high-security desktop” environment would take a lot of the security pressures off individual apps, obviating the need for these endless “Do you want to grant permission for X to access Y to do Z?” requests. Which, as any security fule kno, are worse than useless at protecting users; protecting only the platform vendor from taking the blame when the inevitable fuckups occur (aka Blame the Luser).

That’s the user-security model Apple ought to pursue, but they’ve been stuck so long in their classically atomic Application-centric view of the universe I don’t think they can imagine a platform where atomic Apps are subservient to the big smooshy probability cloud of user tasks that surrounds them. Partly because that nice simple neatly-packaged atomic App model is what generates revenue, but also partly because it requires giving up control; and both developers and marketeers like keeping control very much, and fear very much ceding it to anyone else.

That takes courage, and Apple hasn’t had that sort of courage for a decade.

But putting Control into the hands of Users, in a form that those users can use, is the very core of UX, and nowhere more important than protecting users from “themselves”.