Re:How the CIA used Crypto AG encryption devices to spy on c...
by jMyles on Tuesday February 11, 2020 @06:09PM
(#22303962)
He said that, from his vantage point, analysts at BAH didn't have access to capabilities to break PGP emails.
To be sure, that's an important fact. And it does mean that PGP (and for that matter, similar cryptosystems with robust implementations) create a palpable and useful protection against this kind of analysis.
But in the event that the NSA (or other agencies engaged in signals intelligence) have an attack wholly unknown to the literature, it's unlikely that it will be provided in the same toolchain as hunky-dory man-in-the-middle style attacks, such as those disclosed in Snowden's famous slides.
I'm not saying NSA can break PGP - I think they almost certainly can't. But Snowden's revelation on this point shows only that the analysts he was supporting don't have access to novel attacks, not that novel attacks don't exist.
To be sure, that's an important fact. And it does mean that PGP (and for that matter, similar cryptosystems with robust implementations) create a palpable and useful protection against this kind of analysis.
But in the event that the NSA (or other agencies engaged in signals intelligence) have an attack wholly unknown to the literature, it's unlikely that it will be provided in the same toolchain as hunky-dory man-in-the-middle style attacks, such as those disclosed in Snowden's famous slides.
I'm not saying NSA can break PGP - I think they almost certainly can't. But Snowden's revelation on this point shows only that the analysts he was supporting don't have access to novel attacks, not that novel attacks don't exist.