Boeing Starliner's flight's flaws show “fundamental problem,” NASA says

Re:Boeing Starliner's flight's flaws show “fundamental probl... by MaupitiBlue on Tuesday February 11, 2020 @08:25AM (#22298249)

> specific steps to weaken the engineering leadership

What in the world are you talking about? There’s been no reporting of anything like that. The MAX engineers failed all by themselves. No management told them to design MCAS in a brain dead fashion. Nobody “weakened” engineering leadership.

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Re:Boeing Starliner's flight's flaws show “fundamental probl... by toss1 on Tuesday February 11, 2020 @08:39AM (#22298329)

When management makes statements like "we don't need [to pay for] senior engineers here, these are mature products... ", and clearly putting finance first among corporate goals, the natural result is that engineering dies a death by a thousand cuts...

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Re:Boeing Starliner's flight's flaws show “fundamental probl... by MaupitiBlue on Tuesday February 11, 2020 @09:27AM (#22298702)

> When management makes statements like "we don't need [to pay for] senior engineers here

The problem is that Boeing management never said that. Moreover, the fired CEO was an engineer.

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Re:Boeing Starliner's flight's flaws show “fundamental probl... by TheOtherHobbes on Tuesday February 11, 2020 @09:32AM (#22298739)

The important word being "was".

As an engineer, he was accountable to reality. As a CEO, he was accountable to the board and the financials.

Guess which won.

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Re:Boeing Starliner's flight's flaws show “fundamental probl... by Brave-Steak on Tuesday February 11, 2020 @09:45AM (#22298838)

Muilenberg became CEO in 2015. The McDouglas thing happened in '97. He inherited an existing management structure that was already primarily interested in profit over all other concerns, especially engineering.

Moreover, the 737 Max program ran from 2011-2015. The CEO at the time was an MBA.

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