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Re:Critical flaw in Trezor hardware wallets by imtringued on Saturday February 01, 2020 @10:47AM (#22211097)
> if anyone has physical access it's game over

That's true but for only for threat models that assume decapping and other extreme efforts.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_cryptoprocessor

Re:Critical flaw in Trezor hardware wallets by logicallee on Saturday February 01, 2020 @11:04AM (#22211173)
How extreme is decapping? How much equipment and how much time does it require? How often does it destroy the chip or cause damage? How obvious is it that it occurred?

While we're at it, for the last question, tamper evidence, how good are tamper evidence seals - for example would a tamper evident seal on the enclosure show visually whether it has been opened (for example to exploit the flaw this article is about), or are tamper evident seals easy to get around or re-apply undetected?

Re:Critical flaw in Trezor hardware wallets by SAI_Peregrinus on Saturday February 01, 2020 @04:50PM (#22213488)
Decapping requires dissolving the plastic with acid. Attacking the chip from there is typically done in a Focused Ion Beam workstation (about $500k), and the risk of destroying the chip depends on too many factors. Some chips have photosensitive elements that generate just enough voltage to wipe their memory if they're exposed to light via decapping.

Tamper evident seals can often be defeated with nothing more than a PTFE (Teflon) knife made from shim stock.

Re:Critical flaw in Trezor hardware wallets by logicallee on Sunday February 02, 2020 @11:05AM (#22217545)
thanks