Re:The rise and fall of Lisp at the Jet Propulsion Lab (2002)
by mturmon on Monday February 14, 2011 @03:24AM
(#2215926)
Regarding risks, I think you're understating the sophistication and importance of risks on flight projects. (I work at JPL, but not on flight projects; once upon a time, the OP's office was right down the hall from mine.) A modest sized flight project will have a risk list which is itemized down to great detail, covering many pages, and this list will be one of the main things the mission managers work on reducing.
In general, there are two parameters, likelihood of the risk materializing, and cost if it does. Sometimes the cost is easier to bear (dollars and schedule), sometimes it's harder (lose the mission). For units like dollars and schedule, it does make sense to do a weighted average (sum over risks of probability * cost); for others it does not. People go farther and use various Monte Carlo methods to deal with risks that interact, so that the sum above does not work.
Here's someone at JPL who's in that area:
Re:The rise and fall of Lisp at the Jet Propulsion Lab (2002)
by stcredzero on Monday February 14, 2011 @06:34AM
(#2216366)
Sounds like JPL is a lot more sophisticated than NASA in this regard. This is weird, since NASA flys a lot more manned missions.
I've spoken with programmers at NASA. There have been times when management thought source control was a risk. Discovering a bug in the mathematics of an algorithm and fixing it is a risk. (Seriously, management was like: the software worked last time with the math bug, so it should work this time with the math bug.)
...flight s/w, if it works, tends to be passed forward from mission to mission, and quirky choices tend to be weeded out.
Like most organizations, I'd bet most of these decisions are more "gut feeling" than based on anything approaching empirical. (Arguably, the continued existence of old-school companies using "Steak and Strippers, Baby!" sales tactics is a bet that such irrational decision mechanisms persist.)