> I don't think the general public would understand end-to-end encrypted backups.

I imagine you're right; it would still be nice for individuals and organizations to have the _option_ though.

You do have the option. Local device backup with a password.

You can’t even turn off the backup password on an existing device for a new backup without knowing the old password (protecting against Evil Maid problem).

I’ve had to reset a device when I forgot my local iPhone backup password to get it back to unencrypted backups.

You're right, of course.

I had in mind an e2e encrypted backup on Apple's servers, which would be far more convenient than doing it locally. That's all.

Well yeah, hence TFA;

> More than two years ago, Apple told the FBI that it planned to offer users end-to-end encryption when storing their phone data on iCloud, according to one current and three former FBI officials and one current and one former Apple employee.

> Under that plan, primarily designed to thwart hackers, Apple would no longer have a key to unlock the encrypted data, meaning it would not be able to turn material over to authorities in a readable form even under court order.

Mega has an Alexa rank of 372 and over 50 million Android installs. They're a good example of how end-to-end encryption can be popular among the general public when executed properly, and they've even released the source code for their clients.

https://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/mega.nz

https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=mega.privacy.a...

https://github.com/meganz