If you make an exact copy of me at time t, then until the original and the copy part ways and have distinct thoughts and experiences, they're both just me_t, one no more so than the other. At t+1, me_t doesn't exist any more; this is true regardless of how many copies of me_t once existed.
Perhaps a good alternate angle is to consider the “copy” (rather than “replacement”) proposition someone else mentioned: let's say a perfect copy of you could be made (i.e. the entirety of a consciousness is somehow material). Are the two consciousnesses linked somehow? Or are they completely separate despite thinking exactly alike, having the same memories &c.? If they are separate, what happens if the original is killed? Then, the next logical step is to ask how that is different from a consciousness transplant.
It's wild stuff. Or seems like it to a thus-far (presumed) single consciousness.