Amplification attacks and spoofing are taken care of by QUIC, so these are not problems at the moment.
AFAICT, QUIC loosely defines a way to do client address validation, but it isn't required! It's worded as 'CAN' and 'MAY' in places, and places outside the spec basically hint that 'oh no! it adds another round trip'. This makes it feel totally bolted on. Why wasn't it required up front? If someone came up to me with this idea of QUIC, the -first- thing I'd tell them is to solve this problem definitively first. The idea seems sound to me, but not if you let everyone turn it off...
AFAIK it's rather common in multiplayer games to do TCP-like features over UDP, as they usually need the UDP features but also need reliable transport for some data, and it's rather tricky to do both UDP and TCP at the same time.
See for example https://fabiensanglard.net/quakeSource/quakeSourceNetWork.ph... or https://gafferongames.com/post/reliability_ordering_and_cong...
The biggest red flag to me is that it is trivial to make the server send sizable packets to clients who didn't ask for them nor want them. Spoofing is not a solved problem, no matter how many times people scream at providers to block it before it gets out. Why isn't there a minimal ACK process up front? I mean, this thing is designed such that it's vulnerable to reflection attacks on -day 1-.