Of course, paypal's "I lost my authenticator, log me in anyways" button is kind of defeating the purpose...
Unless I'm missing something, RFC 4226 sounds like the RSA SecurID system I've worked with before; which is essentially equivalent to Blizzard's system for World of Warcraft.
In which case, my criticism stands. It's trivially more difficult to phish a keycode and the limited window of opportunity is simply a non-issue.[1]
Unless Google is calculating a one-time pad based on the individual login attempt and sending it along a second channel to the registered user, there'll be almost no reduction in phishing.
[1] The tens of seconds a keycode is valid are more than enough to establish a connection.
Which in turn means you're more likely to get detected. It's not full protection - you'd still need a second channel for that - but it's better than nothing.
It does many good things. That is not one of them.
You can download the Google Authenticator app.
These algorithms are known. You can implement it yourself if you wanted to.
If it is only a moment in time, I assume the phishing script could simply log in at the same time and hope the user has the "once per computer" setting enabled. Though this seems like too big of something to miss. Can anyone offer some clarification?
The verification code generated is valid only for a very short time - so unless the hacker phishes the code, and uses it within 10s of seconds, the code is not valid.
And you get a lot more seconds if you log in within those 10 seconds.
Phishing won't work if the user does not have to enter the key again. It requires a clean (no keylogger etc) initial setup. Once installed if someone phishes the end user wouldn't need to re-enter a key, thus defeating the phishing scheme.
Instead of a fake login page with 2 boxes, a phisher could just create a fake login page with 3 boxes and pass the keycode along with everything else.
The only increased difficulty in phishing, is if the user notes they're seeing a keycode prompt, decides that they probably shouldn't have to enter that again and doesn't just key it in anyway.
When we're talking about people who fall for phishing scams, does that sound all that likely? I mean, these people have a history of ignoring red flags and being blissfully ignorant to what should even raise a red flag.
Now, what two-factor will help mitigate, is casual sniffing, keylogging, shoulder-surfing and saved password cracking.