Re:The McDonnell Douglas-Boeing merger led to the 737 Max cr...
by Arn_Thor on Tuesday January 07, 2020 @04:09AM
(#21978287)
I'm not sure how those figures shake out, so if you could provide a source that would be terrific. Deaths per unit of distance flown for the 737MAX vs a comparable 70s plane.
And still, even if that is the case, the anger stems from the fact that corners seemed to have been cut and warnings ignored. In other words this was not some unforeseen event that was unavoidable. It was in fact avoidable
Re:The McDonnell Douglas-Boeing merger led to the 737 Max cr...
by cameldrv on Tuesday January 07, 2020 @05:41PM
(#21985940)
According to Wikipedia, the 737MAX flew 500,000 flights before it was grounded. According to this: https://randy.newairplane.com/2018/05/22/737-max-a-year-of-s... The average 737MAX flight was about 3 hours. Typically 3 flight hours is about 1250 miles, so the 737MAX flew about 625 million miles, for about 3 fatalities per billion passenger miles.
Here's the best data I could find from the U.S.: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/229020495_Aviation_...
It looks like the U.S. in the 1970s had about 1 fatality per billion passenger miles. To get to 3 per billion, you have to go back to the early-mid 60s. I wasn't able to get worldwide data, but generally the rest of the world has lagged behind the U.S. by a factor of at least 3x.
Cars are about 7 per billion passenger miles (https://www.reddit.com/r/urbanplanning/comments/bw0msc/passe...)
Ultimately, the airlines wanted a common TC and type rating for very good reasons -- it saves money, i.e. human effort in pilot training, the number of pilots that need to be on reserve, maintenance training and staffing, spare parts inventory, etc. These are all laudable goals, and to simply say that Boeing should have designed a new plane is too simplistic. The real problem IMO was the contracts Boeing signed with very high penalties for delivering late or having any additional training whatsoever.
This didn't give the engineers enough flexibility or time to design a safe augmentation system, especially after the discovery during test flights that the pitch instability was worse than expected. That led to a quick patch-up job that totally compromised the redundancy of MCAS.
It's also clear in hindsight that the FAA handed too much authority to Boeing on the certification side, and that they should have been scrutinizing their safety analyses more. That is clearly happening now, to Boeing's consternation.