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Re:Security patch releases to Rails 2.3.x, 3.0.x by nbpoole on Tuesday February 08, 2011 @09:50PM (#2196045)
Fair enough. I guess I'll just have to work it out for myself. :P
Re:Security patch releases to Rails 2.3.x, 3.0.x by tptacek on Tuesday February 08, 2011 @10:10PM (#2196086)
Re:Security patch releases to Rails 2.3.x, 3.0.x by nbpoole on Tuesday February 08, 2011 @10:16PM (#2196106)
That's not it, unless I'm missing something big.

Flash and Java both disallow cross-domain requests unless specifically allowed by a crossdomain.xml file (or you use a DNS rebinding attack on Java). Furthermore, to the best of my knowledge, if you can make an HTTP request in Java or Flash you can read back the result.

Re:Security patch releases to Rails 2.3.x, 3.0.x by emerose on Wednesday February 09, 2011 @02:38AM (#2196755)
I probably shouldn't have phrased that so definitively: I don't have any evidence that Flash is to blame here. In fact, given that this problem required a framework-level fix (rather than, eg, a simple patch from Adobe) I suspect that this affects a lot of things.

In my tweet, I just meant to say that Rails checked for something very simple: a header that Flash's addRequestHeader() can trivially fake out. As Neal points out, that can't be the whole story — but I suspect it's part of it.

Re:Security patch releases to Rails 2.3.x, 3.0.x by nbpoole on Tuesday February 08, 2011 @10:42PM (#2196181)
To be perfectly clear, Sam is not wrong. Flash and Java both let you issue requests with that header. However, if you try and make a cross-origin request, they'll both throw exceptions unless you have permission (in the form of a crossdomain.xml file). I assume that's where the redirects come into play, although I can't imagine how you redirect someone's POST request to a different domain.
Re:Security patch releases to Rails 2.3.x, 3.0.x by tptacek on Tuesday February 08, 2011 @10:45PM (#2196186)
I'm just messing with you both.

Resetting sessions on CSRF failures is going to suck for us.

Re:Security patch releases to Rails 2.3.x, 3.0.x by bonzoesc on Tuesday February 08, 2011 @11:59PM (#2196419)
Is there any reason to reset the session on a CSRF failure vs. just failing the request? Seems like you could have fun DOSing people from their sessions on other sites with that default behavior.
Re:Security patch releases to Rails 2.3.x, 3.0.x by nbpoole on Wednesday February 09, 2011 @12:28AM (#2196492)
That's right. Of course, without knowing more details about the vulnerability, it's hard to say whether there's a benefit to ending the session.
Re:Security patch releases to Rails 2.3.x, 3.0.x by emerose on Wednesday February 09, 2011 @02:16AM (#2196723)
I don't have any inside information on this, but my guess is that this is going to come down to confusion about 302/303/307 redirects. In theory, clients receiving a 302 in response to a POST are supposed to re-send the POST wherever the redirect leads; in practice, clients do all kinds of different things. This feels like just the kind of weird edge case that defeats fragile security mechanisms like crossdomain.xml.