Our modus operandi was that a growth equity investment should _never_ go to zero. The new portfolio thinking has shifted to the right: 1/3 make 1-2x, 1/3 make 2-3x, 1/3 make 3x or more.
Would emphasize your point around services - SaaS investors are generally allergic to this stuff and prefer services to make up as little of revenue as possible. It's typical low margin and not seen to be very "strategic" (though this could be debated).
SaaS is also much easier to analyze and diligence than the typical non-SaaS software company or consumer internet business. I won't say it's dead simple, but it's very much not rocket science. In combination with excess capital, this leads to prices getting bid up as such ease of diligence leads many investors to throw in a term sheet. It's just so easy to get comfortable with this stuff.
One caveat to all this that ties to your last point around the market / economy is volatility. You can see in the data that companies that generate a higher amount of the their growth from SaaS-like retention/upsell see higher valuation volatility when the market turns for any reason. [1] The "best" SaaS companies in the eyes of later-stage investors are typically those with high net revenue retention - but these are also the ones that get whacked the most in corrections.
As far as a downturn taking down growth equity - time will tell.
> As far as a downturn taking down growth equity - time will tell.
As with everything. My prediction is, as the concentration around SAAS increases, more funds will be created (especially if no other instruments can produce such a high predictable growth) leading to more concentration.
If I didn't have a business to run, I would be already trying to raise fund for Series A and B to focus on non-SAAS business. You get quite heavy discount on them as there is little competition and and you again get the 1/3 business model of early stage VC, which can produce outsized returns. over just 3x.
Performance through-the-cycle is a big question. One can point to Salesforce (founded 1999, IPO 2004), which has been around for 20+ years... However, big sample bias here (ditto for my article, with sample n = 1). Salesforce, a big-category-defining company - may not be representative of moderately-sized businesses.
Whoisnnamdi - per your post, revenue retention looks like a key metric driving valuations!
Can you clarify this? What do you mean by "large service revenue" and why does that mean the founders are out of luck?
[0] https://www.sequoiacap.com/china/en/article/measuring-produc...
Always right on time.
The area is moving to lower returns, which still can be good for smaller independent teams that can grow or bootstrap. They'll make a similar return to founders, since VC's cash was needed to fund large teams or infrastructure
That means they abandoned 1/3 portfolio strategy they used to have (1/3 loses money, 1/3 returns exactly 1, 1/3 returns fund) but instead are focusing on steady returns by SAAS companies at 2-3x of the investment.
There are a few major implications:
- for the founders; if you don't fit their narrative, for example you have big chunk of revenue coming from services or you have only few enterprise clients, then you are out of luck
- for the funds; the deals are overly competitive driving up the price and diminishing the returns
- for the market; up until the economy is up to the right, things will be fine. Once things start changing, the first things to go will be a lot of these "nice to have" SAAS companies. In turn they will take down growth equity and freeze funding at the later stage (Series B, C, D, ...).
The last point applies to also to the the article. You can build bootstrapped $1M ARR business, but can you defend it? I think that's the biggest question.