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Re:Plundervolt: Software-Based Fault Injection Attacks Again... by chithanh on Wednesday December 11, 2019 @04:16AM (#21760849)
But then again, the researchers state: "In the paper, we show that Plundervolt may affect SGX's attestation functionality" so they are apparently able to fake at least part of the attestation.

Also it will be interesting to see whether directly talking to the voltage regulation controller on the mobo will circumvent the microcode protection.

Re:Plundervolt: Software-Based Fault Injection Attacks Again... by wahern on Wednesday December 11, 2019 @03:48PM (#21766660)
AFAICT, they were able to randomly flip bits in the enclave. Which isn't great, but doesn't yet break remote attestation as commonly used for DRM schemes, which involves online communication with both Intel and the enclave software provider. They can simply reject attestations if they detect too many authentication attempts from the same CPU, long before you manage to flip the correct bit.

IIRC, reading memory out of the enclave has already been accomplished with other side-channel attacks, so that aspect has been broken. What would be novel is if you could read the per-CPU secret key[1], but that doesn't appear to be what they've done.

[1] Which only Intel knows, which is why remote attestation requires a service contract with Intel for online verification of attestation responses.

Re:Plundervolt: Software-Based Fault Injection Attacks Again... by segfaultbuserr on Friday December 13, 2019 @12:45AM (#21779386)
> whether directly talking to the voltage regulation controller on the mobo

Is it even possible to do that without physical access?

Can you confirm that? Do modern motherboards expose an interface that allows directly control over the voltage regulation in software without physical access?! If so, it's terrifying...

Re:Plundervolt: Software-Based Fault Injection Attacks Again... by chithanh on Friday December 13, 2019 @08:01AM (#21781145)
I am talking working around attestation for someone who operates the computer and wants to subvert SGX enclaves. Whether you need physical access or not is thus inconsequential.