News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:The Great Cannon has been deployed again by lonelappde on Friday December 06, 2019 @01:24PM (#21724578)
There is no problem. Routers can use a self signed cert.
Re:The Great Cannon has been deployed again by zeven7 on Friday December 06, 2019 @02:46PM (#21725303)
Could you expand on that a little? What do you mean? Won't my browser complain if the cert if self signed?
Re:The Great Cannon has been deployed again by etatoby on Friday December 06, 2019 @03:04PM (#21725444)
Yes, it will complain and for good reason: it has no way of knowing whether the kid next door is spoofing your router's IP or Mac address and presenting their own self-signed certificate.

I wouldn't go as far as calling it «capricious constraints imposed by the system of "certificate authorities"» but at the same time, I agree that it's not a fundamental limitation of the technology.

Better protocols could be developed to allow a browser to trust a server without (all) the limitations of the current system.

Re:The Great Cannon has been deployed again by therealjumbo on Saturday December 07, 2019 @06:04PM (#21733213)
My harebrained idea for this:

- let companies register a wild card domain in the .local (or a newlocal) namespace: .acme.local

- designate the acme company with the ability to issue certs that never expire for any name in ".acme.local" but the browser will refuse to use certs signed with that key for anything outside "*.acme.local"

pros:

- the acme company can now make equipment that the users browser can connect to over an encrypted channel with zero config on the user's part

- the equipment can live off the internet indefinitely

- if the acme company is breached, and their signing key is stolen, the attackers can only use that key to impersonate acme company, it doesn't allow them to impersonate any other domains

cons:

- the browser manufacturers don't care about this use case so its never gonna happen

- the cert on the device never expires... and can never be replaced automatically somehow. I think the only workaround is acme could enable users to load their own certs if they are so inclined, but that shouldn't be required.

Re:The Great Cannon has been deployed again by thw0rted on Wednesday December 11, 2019 @06:41AM (#21761569)
You should only have to store the self-signed cert exception once, at least on a given device. Now, if you're being targeted by a state-sponsored actor they might somehow be able to get you onto a honeypot network within the 2-minute window between plugging in your router and making your first connection to its web interface, but for everybody else a self-signed cert that you accept once during initial setup should be plenty good enough.