However, little drones (and other small-scale autonomous devices with fast computers and high-bandwidth connections) could still have a large effect on high-intensity air or naval combat even without scenarios of a modest number of supersmart drones duking it out with a conventionally-sized aircraft or ship or sub. One scenario that seems likely to me is many supersmart drones and balloons and buoys with staring passive sensors cooperating with a modest number of devices that resemble modern radar/sonar platforms and with a small number of devices that resemble 1980-era missiles or torpedoes. (In this scenario, the small vehicles do have a clear cheapness advantage in a suitably-scaled way: roughly "[much!] cheaper per kilometer of effective sensor aperture size".) Another scenario is that a war of attrition involving progressively smaller, slower, and stealthier devices might make it a new kind of PITA to secure the immobile facilities (e.g., roads and ports and airfields) that current big-vehicle systems rely on.
Of course, it's somewhat moot trying to analyze high-intensity war as a problem of engineering on the battlefield as long as we don't understand the strategic dynamics of high-intensity war in the presence of incredibly cost-effective indiscriminate weapons like hydrogen bombs. It seems to be at least as much an intractable game theory problem as an engineering problem. (And as David Friedman said, "when I am picking problems to work on, ones that stumped John von Neumann go at the bottom of the stack.")
Whether this is a good or bad thing only time will tell.
Typically drones are used against targets that are human, I don't see the drones causing less loss of life.
Humans are surprisingly cheap and effective machines themselves.