> In Indonesia this was not even in the manual, and the pilots were never even told MCAS existed.

It wasn't necessary to know MCAS existed - the procedure for runaway trim is in the manual and is the correct response to MCAS failure as MCAS failure exhibits itself as runaway trim.

> superhuman ability to stay airborne.

Turning off the stab trim with the cutoff switches is part of the memory procedure to deal with runaway trim, and no superhuman abilities are required. Just remembering to do it.

> You are avoiding

Not at all. I just take issue with the claim that pilots had no role in the accidents, and take issue with the bad design of the MCAS software being a cost saving measure.

Note that the fix is redesigning the MCAS software.

Did you read in the article where Captain Sullenberger said he couldn’t do it in time in a simulator, even expecting it? Have you seen the YouTube videos? It’s a disaster.

> Did you read in the article where Captain Sullenberger said he couldn’t do it in time in a simulator

I did read the article, and that isn't what he said. Furthermore, Captain Sullenberger is an Airbus pilot and hasn't flown 737s in a long time and is not rated on the 737NG.

I don't know what runaway trim procedures are on Airbus airplanes.

It is also possible he is being a guy who knows exactly what he is talking about and has the qualifications and experience to back it up.

If an aircraft starts pitching down, and it wasn't commanded by the pilot, and resetting the trim (temporarily) fixes the problem, the issue is almost certainly with the trim. If it is MCAS and a malfunctioning sensor or a failing motor that occasionally kicks on and drives the trim to its limits, the pilot response should be the same. This is what I hear Walter saying, and it makes sense. MCAS just makes it more probable to manifest.

The thing is the checklist says in a runaway stabilizer scenario, it will trim continously, but MCAS does not apply trim continously. Therefore it does not exhibit itself as a "normal" trim runaway. Checklist: https://i.imgur.com/K7El4K4.jpg

Hence, they might not have thought it was a trim runaway.

Not every emergency manifests as a textbook case. It isn't too farfetched to imagine an intermittent short running the trim motor on an intermittent basis rather than continuously. I'd still shut off the trim motor as a possible remedy, but I'm not an airliner pilot, just a guy who flys for $100 hamburgers.

I'd really like to see the NTSB report on this when it is released. I've read some of them, they're far more detailed and contain a lot of pertinent facts that were omitted from the usual clickbait sensationalist journalism.

If you did, I certainly don't see it in your arguments.

I think you should read his comment again, and evaluate tenses.

Not being rated on the 737NG is significant if someone were to claim to be an expert in that same airplane.

"It wasn't necessary to know MCAS existed...". If I ever read something as dangerous as that I don't when. First, MCAS had only one sensor input foregoing redundancy. Second, everything I know about airworthiness, which is by no means complete, says otherwise.