TPM–Fail: TPM Meets Timing and Lattice Attacks

Re:TPM–Fail: TPM Meets Timing and Lattice Attacks by vermilingua on Tuesday November 12, 2019 @11:37PM (#21521218)

If I’m reading this correctly, it means the private key of a certificate is leaked during generation. Boot chains rely on the verification of certificates and signed data, not signing. So no.

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Re:TPM–Fail: TPM Meets Timing and Lattice Attacks by baroffoos on Tuesday November 12, 2019 @11:40PM (#21521225)

So this lets you grab the key on your own device which is used to encrypt the storage but not the OEM key used to sign the firmware image?

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Re:TPM–Fail: TPM Meets Timing and Lattice Attacks by dlgeek on Wednesday November 13, 2019 @01:30AM (#21521622)

Almost. s/encrypt the storage/sign the remote attestation document/.

Storage would be encrypted with a symmetric AES key, this only leaks asymmetric ECDSA signing keys

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