Re:TPM–Fail: TPM Meets Timing and Lattice Attacks
by dfox on Tuesday November 12, 2019 @10:22PM
(#21520926)
In my view this is some kind of argument as for why you should not (ab)use TPM as general purpose HSM (ie. for something that it is not designed for) and it does not say much about the security when it is used correctly (as a local attacker that has TPM in state where it will sign literally anything I throw at it, what exactly does key recovery attack buy me?)
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Re:TPM–Fail: TPM Meets Timing and Lattice Attacks
by tedunangst on Tuesday November 12, 2019 @11:21PM
(#21521144)
Not sure why you'd say it's not designed for this. They call out the fact that it was specifically certified for such use and to be resistant to such attacks.