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Re:The Maturing of QUIC by Wicher on Tuesday November 12, 2019 @01:50AM (#21512059)
As I read the RFC[1], every endpoint is supposed to disable the spinning on about 1 in 8 connections. I presume to force middleboxes to accept connections with and without it set.

> Even when the spin bit is not disabled by the administrator, implementations MUST disable the spin bit for a given connection with a certain likelihood. The random selection process SHOULD be designed such that on average the spin bit is disabled for at least one eighth of network paths.

[1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-quic-transport-23#sec...

Re:The Maturing of QUIC by Wicher on Tuesday November 12, 2019 @01:55AM (#21512073)
(and as long as there is at least one actor interested in RTT, and this actor happens to controlling both endpoints for a significant amount of traffic crossing the internet (Chrome/Google), there will be good mix of connections with and without spinbit)