News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:Jellyfish GPU Rootkit by baybal2 on Monday November 11, 2019 @06:57PM (#21510200)
Now, who put WebGL and WebCL into the browser? Just how many of GPU instructions can be made to sneakily peek/write into host's memory?

P.S. Perfect, now Google disabled the option to turn off webgl in Chrome

Re:Jellyfish GPU Rootkit by theamk on Monday November 11, 2019 @10:14PM (#21511238)
> Just how many of GPU instructions can be made to sneakily peek/write into host's memory?

Ideally, zero. Of course in real life this will be non-zero, but I like to believe that with the huge bounty Google offers on chrome vulns, those bugs will be fixed before they could exploit me.

(Note that the original page says "Can snoop on cpu host memory via DMA" -- this only works within the process boundary via approved APIs. So basically no extra security risks, this is exactly the same thing that CPU-based LD_PRELOAD files can do already)

Re:Jellyfish GPU Rootkit by badrabbit on Monday November 11, 2019 @07:29PM (#21510373)
I think browsers are sandboxed even for GPU access. But I am now curious if persistent tracking can be done using GPU memory due to warm reboot resilience.
Re:Jellyfish GPU Rootkit by fao_ on Monday November 11, 2019 @08:38PM (#21510754)
> I think browsers are sandboxed even for GPU access. But I am now curious if persistent tracking can be done using GPU memory due to warm reboot resilience.

You probably seen this, but in case you haven't: https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/02/now-s...

Re:Jellyfish GPU Rootkit by badrabbit on Monday November 11, 2019 @08:48PM (#21510802)
I have not heard of that specific technique. Thanks.
Re:Jellyfish GPU Rootkit by fulafel on Tuesday November 12, 2019 @12:36AM (#21511784)
WebGL specifies that memory is always pre-zeroed. There were implementation bugs in this in the early days though.
Re:Jellyfish GPU Rootkit by baybal2 on Monday November 11, 2019 @08:04PM (#21510554)
The sandboxing ends as soon the browser calls the GL library, and you have really no control whatsoever of what will be happening after that.

Up until very, very recently, driver coders had no idea at all that GPU instructions can be used offensively, and it is still common for buggy GPU code to crash your program/driver/os or the GPU itself.

Sandboxing is nearly useless when you let so much executable code through it.

Re:Jellyfish GPU Rootkit by theamk on Tuesday November 12, 2019 @12:27AM (#21511758)
GL library is pretty high level, so most of the functions are safe. You don’t in general specify direct GPU instructions to run, instead it is large things like “apply transform”

GL does allow uploading some code to card sometimes, in form of shaders for example, but this is fairly constrained and limited language.

Re:Jellyfish GPU Rootkit by AstralStorm on Tuesday November 12, 2019 @12:28PM (#21515970)
Unfortunately there are some ancient but still supported old OpenGL extensions that could allow arbitrary code execution on GPU. New ones too.

E.g. uploading a fake "already compiled" shader binary in OpenGL 4 via glProgramBinary. I'd be surprised if these are actually validated. (Well more than a CRC plus length. On GCN it is CRC32. On Intel's, some hacked SHA256-alike.)

SPIR-V probably is better checked, but I wouldn't trust it farther than I can throw it. There's too many vendor and architecture specific extensions.

Re:Jellyfish GPU Rootkit by zemu on Monday November 11, 2019 @10:45PM (#21511342)
how would one spoof their GPU if they wanted to?