From my experience, a lot of hardware is terribly insecure against exploits. Not necessarily the CPU but stuff like your GPU or HBAs, ethernet cards, etc.
With software containment, the advantage is that you can set it up that drivers need to declare their interfaces and privileges beforehand. In an ELF or WASM you have to declare imported and linked functions, it should not be difficult to leverage that to determine what a driver can effectively do. With WASM you get the added benefit that doing anything but using declared interfaces results in a compile-time error.
A driver can be written so that a minimal, audited interface exists to talk to the hardware almost directly with some security checks and then the WASM part that handles the larger logic parts and provides the actual functionality.
WASM isn't a supervisor, so exploits on VM code aren't that relevant. Exploiting the WASM compiler/interpreter/JIT is more interesting but those are exposed to the daily internet shitstorm exploits, so I think they are fairly safe.
If a driver runs in user mode, an exploit needs to exploit the hardware as well - and that is for all intents and purposes something that we see very rarely.
If the same driver runs in "software user mode", but executing as supervisor (basically inside an VM environment), we need constant security checks in software, and an exploit now have the VM code to further exploit, if successful that will automatically grant it supervisor access.
In both cases it's assumed that neither implementation has access to more interfaces than necessary for it to do it's work. For instance, a driver for a mouse does not need access to the disks.