IMO you're not going far enough. The whole UNIX setuid notion is fundamentally broken to me. The ability to execute a file should logically have nothing to do with the permissions granted to you when doing so. Windows gets this right.
_If_ you turn it all the way up. The default setting "3" allows certain "approved" apps to be launched without the UAC prompt, based on what's in their manifest I think. Turn it up to "4" and it works as expected.
If you're looking for a quick way to elevate the Explorer shell, run `hh \` (the Html Help viewer) from an elevated prompt.
[1] https://devblogs.microsoft.com/oldnewthing/20160816-00/?p=94...
There is an almost comical list of bypasses in built-in AutoElevate programs that Microsoft does not triage as security bugs because as you note they don't call UAC a security feature. I think this is a rather silly deflection that users are unlikely to understand, for good reason.
Note, in particular, that there was nothing in my comment that depended on the existence of UAC. Had I written my comment before UAC even existed (say, in the XP era), it would've been exactly the same.
Yet somehow you managed to change the subject of discussion to a very specific feature UAC, a feature that was only introduced around the Vista era and which I had not even mentioned in my comment once. Then you bashed it based on a premise that you already knew was incorrect and therefore had to put in quotes, and then continued as if the point I had been making in my comment all along was to somehow endorse the use of this controversial feature I never mentioned for a purpose that it itself had not been intended. This is not a faithful representation of what I wrote.
It's hard to quantify that "this code is obviously wrong" feeling, for example liberal intermixing of concerns within a single procedure in many places of the code. Options with little to no security value (requiretty) documented as if they do, the ability to pass control to user-supplied policy plug-ins from a setuid binary, etc. There is just far too much going on to expect it not to regularly break
Ignoring the implementation, I think it's fair to say sudo is broken in concept, simply by trying to have this kind of expressive policy language in the first place. The set of skills required to safely expose some subset of functionality to an untrustworthy user is perfectly distinct from those involved in typical sysadmin.